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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(j)(1996). This case was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court 
of Appeals pursuant to Notice dated June 1, 1998. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment based upon the undisputed fact that the name "Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center" was not sold in the transaction between Defendants and IHC Hospitals, 
Inc.? 
2. Did the trial court err in concluding there were no disputed issues of material 
fact precluding an award of summary judgment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court's ruling on a summary judgment motion is a legal determination and 
is therefore accorded no deference on review. Instead, the trial court's ruling is reviewed 
for correctness. Atcittv v. Board of Educ. of San Juan Cntv Sch. Dist. 967 P.2d 1261, 
1262 (Utah App.1998). This Court must decide "whether the trial court erred in applying 
the governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed 
issues of material fact." Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores. Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 887 
P2d 848, 850 (Utah 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; 
Rule 30, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
1 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was filed in 1991 by Salt Lake Knee and Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. 
("Rehabilitation") against Salt Lake Knee and Sports Medicine and its general partners 
("Salt Lake Knee") in Salt Lake County, Utah, alleging breach of contract and requesting 
a declaratory judgment and an accounting in connection with the sale of certain business 
assets by Salt Lake Knee to IHC Hospitals ("IHC") in the formation of the Sports Medicine 
West joint venture. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Salt Lake 
Knee and against Rehabilitation in November of 1993, ruling that the sale by Salt Lake 
Knee of one-half of specific business assets did not constitute a "sale" to a "third party" 
within the definition of Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement between Rehabilitation 
and Salt Lake Knee. 
Rehabilitation appealed the initial summary judgment order, and this Court, 
exercising its appellate jurisdiction on referral by the Supreme Court, reversed the 
summary judgment and concluded that the sale was to a separate entity - - the new joint 
venture, Sports Medicine West, which for purposes of the Termination Agreement, was a 
third party. Salt Lake Knee and Sports Rehabilitation. Inc. v. Salt Lake Knee and Sports 
Medicine. 909 P.2d 266 (Utah App. 1995) ("Salt Lake Knee I"). 
However, instead of simply overturning the summary judgment of the district court 
on the only issue in the appeal and remitting the case to the trial court, this Court 
proceeded to comment on other issues not before it. The opinion in Salt Lake Knee I 
stated that there was only one issue left to be resolved by the trial court, namely "whether 
the joint venture [Sports Medicine West] continued to operate the business under the same 
2 
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name." Jd. at 270. 
On remand and after further discovery, a second motion for summary judgment was 
filed by Salt Lake Knee before the district court on the basis that although the Termination 
Agreement required a sale of it, the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" was not one 
of the business assets transferred by Salt Lake Knee to IHC in the creation of the new joint 
venture, Sports Medicine West. The summary judgment motion was also premised on the 
basis that on remand, the comment by this Court in Salt Lake Knee I as to the remaining 
issues to be resolved in the case was obiter dicta and was not binding upon either the 
parties or the district court. 
On summary judgment, the district judge examined the undisputed material facts 
which plainly demonstrated that the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" was not sold 
as part of the IHC purchase. Upon review of the appeal in Salt Lake Knee I. the district 
court concluded that the issue as to the sale of the name was not the basis of the first 
summary judgment and was not before this Court in the initial appeal. The trial court 
further concluded that Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement between Salt Lake 
Knee and Rehabilitation expressly required that the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
Center" be sold as part of the sale. Finally, the court found that there were no disputed 
material facts involved and that the name was not sold. The trial court therefore granted 
summary judgment dismissing Rehabilitation's Complaint on February 10, 1998. 
From the amended order on summary judgment, Rehabilitation has taken this 
appeal. 
3 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of the case does not adequately present the facts accurately 
or completely. Therefore, Appellees choose to set out their own Statement of Facts 
pursuant to Appellate Rule 24(b). 
1. Defendants Thomas D. Rosenberg, M.D., P.C., and Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., 
P.C., were partners and principals in the partnership known as Salt Lake City Knee and 
Sport Medicine (referred to collectively as "Salt Lake Knee"). (R. at 40.) 
2. Salt Lake Knee maintained its primary practice and clinic on 8th Avenue in Salt 
Lake City, Utah ("Eighth Avenue Clinic"), and also operated a clinic in Park City, Utah 
("Park City Clinic"). See Exhibit B, fl4 to Pis.' Mem. P.&A. Supp. Mot. Summ. J . , annexed 
hereto as Attachment "A." (R. at 695-732.) 
3. Salt Lake Knee was also involved in a partnership with Dr. Russell Toronto 
("Center Partnership") to operate a much smaller clinic located at 670 East, 3900 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. ]d. This clinic was known as the "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center 
("Center"). Dr. Rosenberg, Dr. Paulos, and their legal entities had very little involvement 
with the Center. ]dat1|5. 
4. Plaintiff Salt Lake Knee and Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. ("Rehabilitation") entered 
into a Professional Services Contract and Lease Agreement ("Professional Services and 
Lease Contract") with the Center Partnership on or about September 23, 1987. (R. at 
238-39.) Rehabilitation is an experienced provider of physical therapy services, and it, or 
its principals, have operated numerous clinics both within the State of Utah and in 
neighboring states for many years. See Deposition of Douglas B. Toole at 24-46, annexed 
4 
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as Attachment "B." 
5. Pursuant to the Professional Services Contract, Rehabilitation operated as an 
independent contractor providing physical therapy services to the Center Partnership's 
patients. A copy of the Professional Services Contract is annexed as Attachment "C." (R. 
at 127-41.) 
6. On or about May 22, 1989, the Center Partnership and Rehabilitation mutually 
agreed to terminate the Professional Services Contract, and executed a Termination and 
Purchase Agreement ("Termination Agreement") to effectuate this purpose. A copy of 
the Termination Agreement is annexed as Attachment "D." (R. at 234-35.) 
7. The parties agreed in the Termination Agreement that if the Center were "sold" 
to a third party within two years, Rehabilitation would be entitled to one-third of that portion 
of the purchase price which is attributed to good will. See Attachment "D" at 5-6. 
8. The parties agreed to define in Paragraph 11, the term "sale" precisely for the 
purpose of the Termination Agreement. A "sale" would exist only if a third party purchased 
and acquired: 
(i) the Center's lease; 
(ii) ownership of the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center"; 
(iii) all of tne equipment and other assets located at the Center; and 
(iv) all of the Center's patients and accounts receivable. 
Further, Paragraph 11 provided that the purchaser must assume complete operational 
control of the business and continue to operate under the same name at the same location. 
The full text of Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement states: 
5 
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Purchase of Center. It is agreed that if within 
two (2) years from the date of this Agreement, 
[Defendants] sell the Center to any third party, 
[Plaintiff] will be entitled to one-third (1/3) of that 
portion of the purchase price which is attributed 
to good will. "Sale" shall be defined as a transfer 
wherein the purchaser acquires and pays 
consideration for all of the following: 
The Center's lease on the Leased Premises, 
ownership of the name "Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center, all of the equipment and other 
assets located at the Center, the Center's 
patients and accounts receivable, and whereby 
the purchaser assumes complete operational 
control of the business of the Center and 
continues operating under the same name at the 
same location. 
See Exhibit "D" at 5-6 (emphasis added). (R. at 8-15.) 
9. Rehabilitation thereupon moved from the Center, taking with it the name of its 
entity, its practice, and its patients. See Exhibit "B" to Attachment "A" at H 9. 
10. On May 24,1990, Appellees entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement ("IHC 
Agreement") with IHC Hospitals, Inc. ("IHC") in which Appellees sold IHC an undivided 
one-half interest in specific assets used in the medical practices it owned and operated at 
its clinics located at 359 Eighth Avenue in Salt Lake City, Utah, at the Park City Resort 
Center in Park City, Utah, and at the Center ("IHC Transaction"). Appellees and IHC then 
contributed their respective one-half interests in these assets to form a joint venture called 
"Sport Medicine West." (R. at 464.) 
11. It is undisputed that the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" was not sold 
to IHC as part of the IHC Agreement. In fact, the assets sold were specifically identified 
6 
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in a very detailed list. As a review of the relevant portions of the Asset Purchase 
Agreement demonstrates, the name of the Center appears nowhere on the list: 
1. Purchase and Sale. Seller hereby sells, transfers, and 
assigns to Buyer, and hereby purchases from Seller, an 
undivided one-half interest in the following described property 
(collectively, the "Assets"): 
(a) Personal Property and Accounts. Seller's right, title and 
interest in and to all furniture, fixtures, equipment, appliances, 
inventory, uniforms, promotional materials, printed matters, 
supplies, books, records, prepaid expenses, prepaid taxes, 
prepaid contractual payments and deposits, cash on hand, 
bank deposits, accounts receivable and proceeds and 
products thereof, records pertaining to accounts receivable, 
causes of action, licenses, miscellaneous personal property, 
goodwill and general intangibles, with respect to the Rehab 
Facilities and the Park City Facilities, including, without 
limitation, the property and items described on Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto (collectively, the "Personal Property and 
Accounts"). 
(R. at 464.) A copy of the pertinent section 1(a) of the Asset Purchase Agreement is 
annexed as Attachment "E." 
12. After the IHC transaction closed, Sports Medicine West also moved from the 
3900 South Center and relocated to 5848 South 200 East, Murray, Utah. Thomas 
Rosenberg Depo. at 23, annexed hereto as Attachment "F." 
13. On October 4,1991, Rehabilitation filed the instant action seeking a declaratory 
judgment that a "sale" had occurred, and that Rehabilitation was entitled to one-third of the 
value of the goodwill transferred. (R. at 2 et seq.) 
14. On June 15, 1993, Salt Lake Knee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 
arguing that Rehabilitation could produce no evidence that the specific requirements of a 
7 
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"sale" were met. (R. at 168 et seg.) Rehabilitation filed a Counter Motion for Summary 
Judgment stating that all of the requirements of a "sale" were met by the IHC Agreement. 
(R. at 199etseq.) 
15. The trial court granted Salt Lake Knee's motion in an Order signed on 
December 6, 1993. The court ruled that a sale of only one-half of the specified business 
assets to a "third party" had occurred. Rehabilitation's Counter Motion for Summary 
Judgment was denied. (R. at 358-360.) 
16. On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court, ruling that the joint venture, 
Sports Medicine West, constituted a "third party" under the Termination Agreement. Salt 
Lake Knee I. 909 P.2d at 269. After resolving the sole issue presented on appeal, the 
Court went on to comment on additional issues that were not before the Court. Specifically 
the Court concluded, in dicta, that the Termination Agreement's requirements that 
consideration be paid for the Center's assets, and that the third party have complete 
operational control of the Center, were satisfied. ]d_. 
17. The Court then noted, again in dicta, that "according to the parties, the only 
remaining issue is whether the joint venture continued operating the business under the 
name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center." \± at 270. The statement appears without 
citation. Moreover, there was nothing in the briefs or otherwise that suggested this was 
the only issue left for resolution. The Court then remanded the case for determination. 
18. On December 19, 1997 and after further discovery, Salt Lake Knee filed a 
second Motion for Summary Judgment based primarily upon the undisputed evidence that 
the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" was not sold as part of the IHC Agreement 
8 
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and this issue was not resolved before or decided by this Court in the prior appeal. (R. at 
691 et seg.) The issue was viewed by the trial court as squarely before it. As the trial court 
noted: 
THE COURT: I'm not persuaded the Court of Appeals 
addressed this issue at all. I think they looked at my ruling as 
far as all of the ownership being sold, and - which I said only 
half of it was sold, therefore it was not a sale. 
And they said it was a joint venture, and so be it. I don't 
remember addressing the issue, and I don't think it was ever 
raised before me, as far as the name. 
I don't know this; but I probably just assumed it was sold in 
there, and didn't even consider it, because I don't remember 
considering a thing about it at all. 
Counsel for Rehabilitation conceded that the issue was not before this Court in the prior 
appeal: 
MR. GREEN: Well, you know, I would submit it had not been 
addressed, but again I think that there's an issue with regard 
to whether the use of that name constituted a sale, regardless 
of how those documents were drafted. 
The transcript of the January 27, 1998 hearing on Salt Lake Knee's motion for summary 
judgment is annexed as Attachment "H." See Attachment "H" at 28-29. 
19. The motion for summary judgment was also based in part on the fact that no 
part of the purchase price of the Center was attributable to goodwill. See Attachment "A." 
20. The district court granted Salt Lake Knee's motion on the basis that the sale did 
not include the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center": 
THE COURT: Well, counsel, let me indicate this to you. As I 
have been reading your pleadings, first of all let me indicate, 
or state, that no, I don't think this issue was raised on appeal. 
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I don't think this issue was raised to me on the first 
motion for summary judgment. This court does not recall 
any issue at all of this sort on the particular name. 
I would state to you that if this had been raised on the 
first instance of summary judgment, that the court 
probably, unhesitatingly, would have granted the 
defendant's motion, as I read the particular contract 
And, from the evidence before me, the name - there's 
nothing in the evidence that indicates that the name "Salt Lake 
Sports Medicine" was sold as part of this contract.... 
And, therefore, I must grant the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment on that issue. 
See Attachment "H" at 38-39 (emphasis added). Rehabilitation timely filed the instant 
appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the summary judgment order of the district court. After full 
discovery, it is manifest that there are no genuine issues of material fact that the business 
assets sold by Salt Lake Knee to the new joint venture, Sports Medicine West, did not 
include the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center." Paragraph 11 of the Termination 
Agreement, accordingly, was not triggered by the Salt Lake Knee sale. 
The name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" was clearly an identifiable and distinct 
asset carrying with it trade name and assumed business name rights that were retained 
by Salt Lake Knee. The argument of Rehabilitation, a stranger to the IHC Transaction, that 
although the business assets sold were specifically delineated in the agreements, the 
name should nonetheless be implied as included as well, is a flawed argument without any 
authoritative or judicial support. 
10 
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As to the issue of the sale of the name, this question was not raised and was not 
before this Court in Salt Lake Knee I. Salt Lake Knee never had the opportunity of moving 
forward arguing before the district court the issue of whether the sale included the name 
"Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center," until it was presented to and decided by the district 
court upon remand. The district court properly concluded that the scope of remand was 
not limited by what we respectfully submit was dicta in Salt Lake Knee I. Rehabilitation, 
itself, acknowledged to the district court that the issue of the name was not presented to 
the district court or to this Court in the initial appeal. 
Salt Lake Knee's motion for summary judgment was solidly based and the order of 
the district court granting summary judgment should be affirmed herein. 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
I. REHABILITATION FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THERE WERE ANY 
GENUINE, MATERIAL FACTS AT ISSUE AND EQUALLY FAILS TO SHOW 
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
A. Rehabilitation Has Conspicuously Failed to Cite to the Court the 
Controlling Paragraph of the Asset Sale Agreement and Has Miscited 
the Controlling Paragraph of the Salt Lake Knee Termination 
Agreement 
The Appellant, Rehabilitation, does not set out the individual aspects of its argument 
under separate points as envisioned by Appellate Rule 24 and typical appellate practice, 
but rather mixes the issues together under a generic "Argument." It not only fails to 
address the material contractual provisions before the Court, but it inexplicably leaves out 
a phrase in a critical paragraph of the Termination Agreement. 
Rehabilitation focuses its argument on Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement 
between Rehabilitation and Salt Lake Knee. Paragraph 11 provides that if there is a sale 
of certain assets of the previous Center within two years of the date of the Termination 
Agreement, Rehabilitation shall be entitled to one-third of the purchase price attributed to 
good will. However, such a qualifying sale is only triggered if the ownership of the name 
"Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" is, along with other specified assets, a part of the sale. 
Paragraph 11 specifically reads: 
Purchase of Center. It is agreed that if within two (2) years 
from the date of this Agreement, [Defendants] sell the Center 
to any third party, [Plaintiff] will be entitled to one-third (1/3) of 
that portion of the purchase price which is attributed to good 
will. "Sale" shall be defined as a transfer wherein the 
purchaser acquires and pays consideration for all of the 
following: 
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The Center's lease on the Leased Premises, ownership of 
the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center", all of the 
equipment and other assets located at the Center, the Center's 
patients and accounts receivable, and whereby the purchaser 
assumes complete operational control of the business of the 
Center and continues operating under the same name at the 
same location. 
(R. at 12-13)(emphasis added). 
Rehabilitation cited this paragraph to the Court in its opening Brief. See Br. of 
Appellant at 7. With respect to the last sentence of Paragraph 11 dealing with what 
constitutes a "sale," Rehabilitation omits the critical phrase emphasized above: "ownership 
of the name Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" and then argues that the sale of a name 
is implicit in the sale of assets of a business. 
Perhaps Rehabilitation would like the clause in Paragraph 11 to read as they have 
stated in their Brief, for their burden in this appeal would be substantially lighter. Whether 
it was an inadvertent but "Freudian slip" on Rehabilitation's part, the fact is that the 
Termination Agreement absolutely required that to trigger a "sale" under Paragraph 11, the 
sale had to include "ownership of the name 'Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center'." 
It is clear that when Salt Lake Knee and IHC executed the Asset Purchase 
Agreement, they went to great lengths in delineating the assets that were part of the sale. 
Paragraph 1(a) sets out the specific assets as to which an "undivided one-half interest" 
were sold to the buyer: 
1. Purchase and Sale. Seller hereby sells, transfers, and 
assigns to Buyer, and hereby purchases from Seller, an 
undivided one-half interest in the following described property 
(collectively, the "Assets"): 
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(a) Personal Property and Accounts. Seller's right, title and 
interest in and to all furniture, fixtures, equipment, appliances, 
inventory, uniforms, promotional materials, printed matters, 
supplies, books, records, prepaid expenses, prepaid taxes, 
prepaid contractual payments and deposits, cash on hand, 
bank deposits, accounts receivable and proceeds and 
products thereof, records pertaining to accounts receivable, 
causes of action, licenses, miscellaneous personal property, 
goodwill and general intangibles, with respect to the Rehab 
Facilities and the Park City Facilities, including, without 
limitation, the property and items described on Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto (collectively, the "Personal Property and 
Accounts"). 
The items set out on Exhibit "A" to the Asset Sale Agreement are annexed hereto as 
Attachment "E." (R. at 464.) 
Although the parties went to great lengths in describing the assets being sold, 
including such things as uniforms, fixtures, and supplies, the name of the previous 
business, "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" was not listed anywhere as an asset to be 
sold. There was a good reason why the name was not sold. That was because it was 
made clear in the Asset Purchase Agreement that the new entity being created by Salt 
Lake Knee and IHC Hospitals, into which the sold assets were transferred, carried the 
name "Sports Medicine West." The Recital page reads as follows: 
R E C I T A L S : 
A. Seller is engaged, and has owned assets utilized, in the 
business of operating certain physical therapy and 
rehabilitation facilities that are presently located at 670 East 
3900 South, and 359 8th Avenue, in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
(collectively the "Rehab Facilities"), and a part time medical 
clinic located at the Park City Resort Center in Park City, Utah 
(the "Park City Facilities"). 
B. Seller desires to sell, transfer, and assign, and Buyer 
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desires to purchase, a undivided one-half interest in certain of 
the assets used in the Rehab Facilities and the Park City 
Facilities, in connection with and as contemplated by that 
certain Joint Venture Agreement of Sports Medicine West of 
even date herewith between Seller and Buyer (the "joint 
Venture Agreement"), upon the terms and conditions set forth 
herein. 
See Attachment "E" at 1. 
When Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement and Paragraph 1 (a) of the Asset 
Purchase Agreement of the new joint venture were pointed out to the District Court, 
Rehabilitation admitted that under general contract interpretation, the name of the former 
business had not been included in the sale of one-half the assets to IHC. See Attachment 
"H"at21, lines 12-13. 
B. Rehabilitation's Argument of an "Implied Sale of the Name" is Logically 
Flawed and Unsupported By Law. 
The district court below granted Salt Lake Knee's motion for summary judgment 
concluding that "Plaintiff has failed to produce any competent evidence raising a genuine 
dispute of material fact on the issue of whether the name '"Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
Center' was sold to IHC or a third party." (R. at 1005-08.) Indeed, Rehabilitation conceded 
before the district court and before this court that the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
Center" was not included in the Asset Purchase Agreement. Moreover, Rehabilitation did 
not produce any evidence demonstrating that Sports Medicine West used the name "Salt 
Lake Sports Medicine Center" in its business operations, in advertising, billing patients, 
business letterhead, or in any ordinary business transactions. 
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Rather, in view of a complete lack of evidentiary support that the name was ever 
sold or transferred to Sports Medicine West, Rehabilitation asks this Court to imply, as a 
matter of law, a sale of the Center's name. In other words, Rehabilitation, as a third-party 
stranger to the agreement between Salt Lake Knee and IHC, contends that even though 
Salt Lake Knee and IHC did not include the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" in 
the sale creating the new joint venture Sports Medicine West, and even though the 
undisputed evidence was that Salt Lake Knee did not intend to and did not sell the name 
to IHC, that the district court below, and this Court on appeal, should nonetheless imply, 
as a matter of law, that the name was nonetheless sold so that Sports Medicine West, 
whether it knew and intended it or not, had "ownership of the name 'Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center.'" This extraordinary non-sequitur is claimed to be based upon the theory 
that (1) Utah case law holds that "good will" includes "a good name," (2) good will is 
impliedly transferred in the sale of a business, and therefore (3) "a good name" is impliedly 
transferred in the sale of a business. 
The flaw in this twisted reasoning is manifest. To begin with, a "good name" as part 
of "good will" of a business, does not mean the precise name of a business, but rather 
means the good reputation or good character of the business. In fact, the very case cited 
by Rehabilitation in its Brief makes this clear. In Sorenson v. Sorenson. 769 P.2d 820 
(Utah App. 1989), this Court noted that good will is the '"summation of all of the special 
advantages, not otherwise identifiable, related to a going concern.'" Id. at 825 (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted). Good will is a combination of many intangible factors, such as 
reputation, clientele loyalty, and the understanding that the business is stable and has 
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integrity. The name of business, by stark contrast, is an identifiable and specific asset, 
protected by trade name law and the Assumed Business Name Statute, which may or may 
not be sold as part of business assets. In point of fact, the name of a business, as in this 
case, is often retained by the owner and not sold in the business operation. Thus, 
Sorenson does not stand for the legal proposition that the precise name of the business 
is impliedly subsumed by the good will in the business. 
The second flaw in Rehabilitation's premise is the assertion that the transfer of good 
will of a business will axiomatically transfer the name of the business. While good will 
cannot be transferred or sold apart from the business with which it is connected, Southern 
Utah Mortuary v. Roger D. Olpin. 776 P.2d 945, 948 (Utah App. 1989), the transfer of good 
will is a totally separate issue from the transfer of the name of the business. The latter can 
be retained or transferred independently of the business, id. In point of fact, in Southern 
Utah Mortuary, the exact case cited by Rehabilitation in support of its argument, the name 
of the business was sold to another party prior to the sale of the business. Accordingly, 
while goodwill was found to be presumably transferred, the name of the business was not. 
id at 949. 
Thirdly, the fallacy of Rehabilitation's argument reaches a new level when it argues 
that although the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" was not expressly included 
among the detailed and long list of assets sold, it also was not expressly excluded. 
Accordingly, Rehabilitation argues that the district court, and now this Court, should 
assume that the name was impliedly transferred. As part of this circular argument, 
Rehabilitation even argues that the right to decide not to use the name Salt Lake Sports 
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Medicine Center is "strong indicia of the sale of ownership of the name." There is good 
reason that Rehabilitation can not point the district court below, or this Court, to a single 
case or other legal authority to support this proposition. There are none. Indeed, if 
Rehabilitation's argument were accepted, there would be no limit to the terms that could 
be implied or inferred into a transaction on the ground that they were not expressly 
excluded. 
Rehabilitation is not entitled to have this Court rewrite the Asset Purchase 
Agreement regarding the sale of assets from Salt Lake Knee to IHC so that it can claim a 
completely different result for purposes of its own Termination Agreement. The controlling 
and unrebutted facts are that the sale of assets from Salt Lake Knee to IHC is marked by 
the most specific listing of assets, such that it is rationally impossible to "imply" the transfer 
of an identifiable and distinct asset such as the name of the Center. In point of law, the 
cardinal rule of contract and statutory construction long recognized in Utah1 that "to 
enumerate is to exclude," closes the door on Rehabilitation's argument. In the IHC 
Transaction, substantial legal documents were generated which identified with particularity 
each and every asset sold. The accurate judicial inference from the sale is that if the name 
"Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" were a part of the sale transaction, this fact would have 
been clearly set forth. There is not a scrap of evidence that would even begin to suggest 
1The Latin maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" has been part of the strong 
precedent of the Supreme Court of Utah. See Salt Lake City v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 844, 855 
(Utah 1994); Ponderosa One L.P. v. Salt Lake City Sanitary Dist. 738 P.2d 635,637 (Utah 
1987); Anderson v. Board of Review of the Indus. Comm'n of Utah. 737 P.2d 211, 218 
(Utah 1987). 
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that the name was intentionally left out of the list of assets sold in order to defeat 
Rehabilitation's contention under its Termination Agreement with Salt Lake Knee. The 
unblemished fact is that the new joint venture always intended to and did use the name 
Sports Medicine West. See Attachment "E." 
Thus, there is not only no evidence to support Rehabilitation's argument of an 
implied sale of the name in the Sports Medicine West Transaction, but the evidence is 
against it. "[0]nce challenged, the party who opposes such a [summary judgment] motion 
must come forward with sufficient proof to support his or her claim, particularly when that 
party has had an opportunity to conduct discovery." Hipwell v. IHC HOSPS., Inc., 944 P.2d 
327, 339 (Utah 1997) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 
2548(1948)). 
C. That the Name Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center May Have Remained 
on a Sign on the Business Premises for a Time After the Termination 
Agreement is not a Material Fact on the Issue of Whether the Sale 
Included the Name. 
With respect to the sale of the name, the best that Rehabilitation can do is the 
argument that for some time after the IHC Transaction took place, the marquee at the 3900 
South leasehold property bore the words "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center." This solitary 
statement comes from two physical therapists, who are not only strangers to the 
Termination Agreement, but also were strangers to the "Sports Medicine West" joint 
venture. As the district court noted, the fact that a party does not take down a sign, or the 
prior name of a business, for a period of time, is not evidence that such name was part of 
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the sale to IHC. Where is any connecting evidence demonstrating a nexus between 
leaving a sign tacked onto leased premises, and evidence that the name was sold and in 
the ownership of Sports Medicine West? 
This case has been pending for five years, during which Dr. Rosenberg, Dr. Paulos 
and other employees of Sports Medicine West and the prior employees of Salt Lake Knee 
and Rehabilitation were deposed. There is no evidence that Sports Medicine West ever 
used or manifested ownership of the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" in its day-
to-day business operations. Significantly, the record is devoid of any evidence that 
telephones were answered with the greeting "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center," that 
letterhead existed using the name, that contracts with vendors were entered into by Salt 
Lake Sports Medicine Center, or that Sports Medicine West ever exercised any indicia of 
ownership of the name. The fact that the marquee at 3900 South was not immediately 
changed after the IHC Transaction is not a material fact and remains disconnected from 
any material fact in this record. Standing alone, failure to change the marquee merely 
demonstrates oversight or inadvertence as happens with many businesses. 
The district court correctly concluded that Rehabilitation had not demonstrated there 
were material facts at issue and, accordingly, properly granted Salt Lake Knee's motion 
for summary judgment.2 
Rehabilitation contends that Salt Lake Knee, prior to the instant motion for 
summary judgment, had never claimed in this case that the name of "Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center" was not sold in the IHC Transaction. Rehabilitation is incorrect. In the 
initial motion for summary judgment, Salt Lake Knee specifically raised and argued that 
Rehabilitation was unable to demonstrate sale of the name. (R. at 174.) 
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II. IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO SALT LAKE KNEE, THE DISTRICT 
COURT DID NOT EXCEED THE PROPER SCOPE OF REMITTITUR. 
A. Rehabilitation Expressly Conceded Thatthe Issue of Whetherthe Name 
Was Sold to the Sports Medicine West Joint Venture Was Not Before 
this Court on Appeal in Salt Lake Knee I. 
As this Court noted in Salt Lake Knee I, the sole issue presented in that appeal was 
whether the district court erred in concluding that the transfer of one-half of the business 
assets of the Center to IHC was a "transfer of less than 'all' of the interest in the Center 
[which] does not trigger the 'sale' definition in Paragraph 11." Salt Lake Knee I. 909 P.2d 
at 269. This Court held that even though one-half of the business assets were transferred, 
Sports Medicine West was a "separate legal entity" which received 'all' of the transferred 
assets and, thus reversed the district court decision. Rehabilitation conceded at oral 
argument before the district court that the question of whether the transaction with IHC was 
"a sale" within the definition of Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement, was the only 
issue before this Court. See Attachment "H" at 29. 
The problem is that in the concluding paragraph of the opinion of Salt Lake Knee 
i, this Court did not limit itself to the framed issue on appeal. Instead, the Court went on 
to comment that the requirement in Paragraph 11 that consideration be paid for the assets 
was also satisfied and that Sports Medicine West assumed full operational control of the 
business assets. 909 P.2d at 270. The Court then went even a step further and observed 
that there was only one issue remaining between the parties, i.e., "whether the joint 
venture continued operating the business under the name 'Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
Center.'" id, at 270. The latter comment, it is respectfully submitted, was dicta and not the 
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law of the case. While Rehabilitation has failed to raise the question of the scope of the 
Court's earlier opinion as an appealable issue in this case, we believe it is appropriate to 
address the issue for the benefit of the Court, nonetheless. 
It is settled law in Utah that an appellate court's ruling is limited to those issues 
specifically raised by the parties and addressed by the trial court, and not to those issues 
which are collateral to the trial court's decision. As this Court observed in D'Aston v. 
rJAston, 844 P.2d 345 (Utah App. 1992): 
[W]hile a reversal effectively invalidates the prior judgment with 
respect to those issues addressed in the appeal, it "extends 
only to those issues which the appellate court decided in 
actuality or by necessary implication: it does not affect 
collateral matters not before the court." 
Jd. at 351 (citing Ave v. Fix. 626 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Mont. 1981) (emphasis added)). The 
Utah Supreme Court announced the same principle in Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. 
Co.. 659 P.2d 1040,1044 (Utah 1983). The respected treatise, Moore's Federal Practice, 
states the rule: 
The law of the case doctrine applies to an issue or issues that 
have actually been decided. The doctrine does not apply to 
statements made by the Court in passing, or stated as possible 
alternatives. 
18 Moore's Federal Practice § 134.20[3] (3d ed. Matthew Bender 1997) (emphasis added). 
On remand, the district court retains jurisdiction to consider issues that were not 
before and/or decided by the appellate court. In Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court. 
Utah County. 191 P.2d 153 (Utah 1948), a seminal decision, the Utah Supreme Court 
noted the well established rule: 
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As to all matters adjudicated by the appellate court, both the 
trial court and the parties are foreclosed from further trying 
those matters. They become the law of the case. But as to 
matters left open by the appellate court, it is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court to permit amended or supplemental 
pleadings as to those matters. 
14at 158 (emphasis added); Slattervv. Covev&Co.. 909 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah App. 1995) 
(same). Thus, 
[although the District Court owes obedience to the mandate of 
the Appellate Court, it retains jurisdiction under the mandate 
rule to reconsider issues on remand that were not expressly or 
implicitly decided by the Appellate Court. A District Court can, 
after remand, come to the same result as before remand by 
reiving on grounds other than those specified in the Appellate 
Court's mandate. 
18 Moore's Federal Practice § 134.23[1][a] (3d ed. Matthew Bender 1997) (emphasis 
added). 
Thus, the rule as applied in this case requires the finding that the only issue which 
was before this Court in Salt Lake Knee I and on which Salt Lake Knee had been given the 
opportunity to be heard was whether the sale of one-half the assets met the definition of 
"sale" under Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement. The trial court then proceeded 
to grant Salt Lake Knee's Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that "there's 
nothing in the evidence that indicates that the name 'Salt Lake Sports Medicine' was sold 
as part of this contract." Id. at 39. 
The one thing consistent about Rehabilitation's position is its inconsistency. On the 
one hand, it contends, without analysis or reference to one single legal authority, that the 
district court improperly exceeded the scope of remand by considering a different and 
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subsidiary issue than the single issue identified by this Court. See Br. of Appellant at 24. 
On the other hand, Rehabilitation told the district court expressly on oral argument that the 
issue of whether the ownership of the name Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center was sold 
in the IHC transaction was not before and was not "addressed" by this Court on appeal. 
Therefore, it could not have been decided. What Rehabilitation argued to the district court 
was that the use of the name somehow "constitutes a sale, regardless of how those 
documents [the Joint Venture Agreement and the Asset Purchase Agreement] were 
drafted." See Attachment "H" at 29. 
The issue of whether the ownership of the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" 
was sold so as to trigger Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement was clearly not 
decided by the trial court in the initial motion for summary judgment and it was not before 
this Court in the prior appeal. Thus, the district court below correctly considered the issue 
of whether Sports Medicine West purchased as an asset, the name "Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center." Summary judgment was properly granted and should be affirmed by this 
Court. 
B. A Holding that the Issue of the Ownership of a Name Was Decided by 
this Court in the First Appeal Would Present a Serious Constitutional 
Due Process of Law Problem as to Salt Lake Knee. 
One of the difficulties facing Rehabilitation is the constitutional argument that, prior 
to the second motion for summary judgment, Salt Lake Knee had never been heard on the 
question of whether the sale to the joint venture, Sports Medicine West, included 
ownership of the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center." Rehabilitation expressly 
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argued to the district court that the issue involving the sale of the name "just came up in 
this motion for summary judgment for the first time, within 30 days." See Attachment "H" 
at 36. In point of fact, Salt Lake Knee did raise that issue, among others, in the first motion 
for summary judgment. (R. at 174.) The district judge never reached the issue in initially 
granting the summary judgment motion and its ruling was squarely based on the 
conclusion that the sale of one-half of the assets from Salt Lake Knee to IHC did not 
constitute a sale of all the assets under Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement. 
Thus, Salt Lake Knee, prior to the February 1998 summary judgment order from 
which this instant appeal is taken, has never had the name issue adjudicated and resolved 
by the district court, the court of general jurisdiction. If somehow the issue were 
adjudicated in the Salt Lake Knee I appeal process without being heard in an evidentiary 
court of record, there would be a denial of due process of law. See In re Estate of Frank 
Veroni. No. 97-L-119, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6365 at *11 (Ohio Ct. App. December 31, 
1998) ('"For more than a century the central meaning of due process has been clear: 
"Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard. ) (citing Baldwin v. Hale, 
68 U.S. 223, 1 Wall. 223, 233 , 17 L.Ed. 531)(1863) (citation omitted)). 
The constitutional question of due process makes the argument all the more 
compelling that the district court did not err in entering summary judgment in concluding 
that the sale to Sports Medicine West did not, under the undisputed material facts, include 
the prior name, so as to trigger Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement. 
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C. The Issue of "Scope of Remand" Should Not Be Addressed by this 
Court Because Rehabilitation Failed Entirely to Comply with Utah Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 24. 
Rehabilitation argues in a casual and conclusory fashion that the district court went 
"well beyond the scope of remand" in reaching the issue of whether the name of the Center 
was sold. See Br. of Appellant at 15, 24. There are strong jurisprudential reasons for 
declining to reach the issue of the scope of remand in this appeal. 
First, Rehabilitation did not list this issue in its "Statement of Issues on Appeal." 
Consequently, in violation of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5), Rehabilitation 
failed to set forth a standard of review for this issue, and failed to make any citations to the 
record indicating where this issue was preserved for appeal below. Second, in violation 
of Rule 24(a)(9), Rehabilitation's Brief fails to present "the contentions and reasons of the 
Rehabilitation with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any 
issue not preserved in the trial court." Third, Rehabilitation also fails to cite a single case 
or other relevant authority in support of its position, in violation of Rule 24(a)(9) and (e). 
Thus, Rehabilitation has failed to comply with the basic requirements of Utah Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 24 with respect to this issue. Under these circumstances, the Utah 
Supreme Court has consistently declined to address the issue presented. See MacKav 
v. Hardy, No. 970251,1998 WL 853976 at *6-7 (December 11,1998) (declining to reach 
issues when brief fails to cite appellate standard of review, and fails to include legal 
argument or precedent); Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1997) 
("Valcarce's brief on appeal contains little analysis on this point. There is no reference to 
legal authority in support of his contention, and no citation to the record Because of 
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inadequate analysis, we decline to address Paul Valcarce's claim on appeal."); State v. 
Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining to address issue where "brief wholly 
lacks legal analysis and authority to support. . . argument"). 
D. Alternatively, The Issue of Continued Use of Name Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center Was Necessarily Predicated upon a Determination that 
the Name was Sold. 
Even if the trial court somehow were limited to determination of the issue of whether 
the joint venture continued to operate the business under the name "Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center," it does not follow that the trial court would be precluded from first 
considering the interrelated issue of whether the name was sold to Sports Medicine West 
joint venture. Both ownership of the name and use of the name were required in order to 
create a sale under paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement. There is a logical nexus 
and interdependency between the two. It would be unlawful for the joint venture to operate 
the business under the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" unless it had been 
determined that the name had been sold. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above this Court should affirm in all respects the judgment 
of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Salt Lake Knee dismissing the 
case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SHELEIGH A. CHALKLEY 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
March 29, 1999. 
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557) 
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON (0099) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS 
REHABILITATION, INC., fka 
;PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
jvs. 
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS 
^MEDICINE, a Utah general 
Ipartnership, LONNIE E. PAULOS, 
JM.D., P.C., a Utah 
'professional corporation and 
THOMAS D. ROSENBURG, M.D., 
P.C, a Utah professional 
corporation, general partners, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910906316 CN 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendants, Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine Center, 
Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C, and Thomas D. Rosenburg, M.D., P.C. 
(the "Defendants") , respectfully submit this Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
• ' 1. On or about May 22, 1989, Plaintiff and Defendant Salt 
Lake City Knee and Sports Medicine entered into a Termination 
Agreement and Purchase Agreement ("Termination Agreement") which, 
among other things, terminated a Professional Services Contract 
and Lease Agreement entered into on or about September 23, 1987 
between Plaintiff and Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center. Complaint 
f6; Amended Answer f7. A true and correct copy of the Termination 
Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" the terms of which are 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
;| 2. Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement provides in 
pertinent part as follows: 
I 11. Purchase of Center. It is agreed that 
if within two (2) years from the date of this 
;{'" Agreement, Physicians [Defendant, Salt Knee & 
h Sports Medicine] sells the Center [Salt Lake 
Sports Medicine Center] to any third party, 
|| Rehabilitation [Plaintiff Salt Lake Knee and 
! Sports Rehabilitation, Inc.] shall be 
11 entitled to one-third (1/3) of that portion 
j of the purchase price which is attributable 
J to good will. "Sale" shall be defined as a 
| transfer wherein the purchaser acquires and 
j pays consideration for all of the following: 
the Center's lease on the leased premises, 
ownership of the name "Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center," all of the equipment and 
other assets located at the Center, and the 
Center's patients and accounts receivable, 
and whereby the purchaser assumes complete 
operational control of the business of the 
Center and continues operating under the same 
name at the same location. 
3. On or about May 24, 1990, defendant Salt Lake City Knee 
and Sports Medicine entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement with ii 
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IHC Hospitals, Inc. (the "IHC Agreement"). Complaint, «R8; 
Affidavit of Dr. Paulos at 110, ATTACHED HERETO AS Exhibit "B". 
4. Pursuant to the IHC Agreement, Salt Lake City Knee and 
Sports Medicine sold to IHC a one-half interest in the medical 
practices it owned and operated at its clinics at Eighth Avenue in 
Salt Lake City; at 3900 South, and also at Park City, together 
;with certain related assets. The other one-half interest was 
conveyed to a joint venture between IHC and Salt Lake City Knee 
•and Sports Medicine Center, known as Sports Medicine West. 
Affidavit of Dr. Paulos at 110. 
•I 5. Drs. Paulos and Rosenberg had a very small practice at 
i j 
J3900 South. It was a fraction of their 8"h Avenue practice. In 
Mconnection with the sale to IHC, a one-half (1/2) interest in 
certain equipment of the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center was sold 
Mto IHC. However, the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" was 
jinot among the assets sold to IHC or conveyed to Salt Lake Sports 
I Medicine Center. Dr. Paulos Affidavit at 5510 and 11. 
6. IHC did not seek to acquire the name "Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center"; it did not pay any consideration for the 
acquisition thereof; and it did not purchase or acquire that 
name, or any interest therein. Further, Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
Center and Salt Lake Knee and Sports Medicine Center did not sell 
to IHC or convey to the Sports Medicine West any interest in the 
name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center." Dr. Paulos Affidavit at 
111; Deposition of Greg Gardner at 41-44, attached hereto as 
iii 
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Exhibit "C".; Deposition of Douglas Toole at 85, attached hereto 
as Exhibit lfD". 
7. No portion of the purchase price paid by IHC to acquire 
assets of the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center were attributed to 
the good will. Dr. Paulos Affidavit at 515, attached here as 
Exhibit "B". 
8. IHC paid $662,225.00 to acquire a one-half interest in 
the clinics and practices owned and operated by Dr. Lonnie Paulos 
and Dr. Thomas Rosenberg, and their entities on Eighth Avenue and 
in Park City and certain assets of Salt Lake City Knee and the 
Salt Lake Sports Medicine and the Sports Medicine Center which 
^operated at 3900 South and in consideration of the non-competition 
.agreement signed by Drs. Paulos and Rosenberg, the multiples paid 
|by IHC was for the non-competition agreement. Dr. Paulos 
i I 
I-Affidavit at f12-15, attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
i j 
!j 9. When the lease with Salt Lake Knee and Sports 
^Rehabilitation, Inc. at 3900 South was terminated on May 22, 1989 
j Gregory Gardner, Douglas Toole and their entity Salt Lake Knee and 
[sports Rehabilitation, Inc., took their patients and relocated 
! I their practice, continuing their rehabilitation practice. 
Deposition of Gregory Gardner at 39-40, attached hereto as Exhibit 
10. On or about October 9, 1991 the Plaintiff Salt Lake 
Sports Knee and Sports Rehabilitation, an entity owned by Gregory 
Gardner and Douglas Toole, filed an action against the Defendants 
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Salt Lake Knee and Sports Medicine and Dr. Lonnie Paulos, M.D., 
P.C. and Thomas Rosenberg, M.D., P.C. to recover one-third of the 
good will attributable to the sale certain of assets of the Salt 
Lake Sports Medicine Center to IHC. 
11. On or about June 15, 1993, Defendants filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment on the basis that no sale of all of the 
:,assets of Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center was made to a third 
party that assumed complete operational control of the business of 
I the Center. 
12. This Court granted summary judgment by Order dated 
December 6, 1993. 
ij 13. By Order dated March 14, 1994, this Court granted 
^Reconsideration and affirmed Summary Judgment. 
ii . . . . 
ij 14. Plaintiffs appealed this Court's decision to the Utah 
I 
11Court of Appeals. By Opinion filed December 21, 1995, the Court 
|| 
jjof Appeals reversed summary judgment on a narrow basis. It held 
j i 
jjthat the sale of certain assets by Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
I Center was a sale to a "third party" within the meaning of 
paragraph 11. Court of Appeals Slip Opinion at 5. 
I 15. The Appellate Court's rationale was that one-half of the 
interest was sold to IHC, a third party, and Salt Lake Knee and 
Sports Medicine transferred the other half to a joint venture 
known as Sports Medicine West, which the Appellate Court 
determined was a separate legal entity. Consequently, it 
determined the sale was to a third party. Id. 
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16. The issue of whether the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
Center" was ever sold by Defendants to IHC or Sports Medicine West 
was not raised by the prior summary judgment motion nor was it an 
issue before the Court of Appeals, and consequently was not 
decided by the Court of Appeals. 
17. The Court of Appeals also did not determine whether the 
joint venture between IHC and Salt Lake City Knee and Sports 
Medicine continued operating the business under the name "Salt 
Lake Sports Medicine Center." 
J 18. Neither did the Appellate Court consider or determine 
what, if any, portion of the purchase price paid for the certain 
jof the assets of the Center were attributable to good will. 
i ARGUMENT 
;! 
This case can and should be disposed of by summary judgment, 
N 
;|as a matter of law for two unavoidable reasons, not previously 
II . . 
jraised in this case nor considered or disposed of by the Court of 
i! 
MAppeals: 
I 1. The provisions of paragraph 11 of the Termination 
! Agreement are triggered only if the name "Salt Lake Sports 
j Medicine Center" were sold to a third party. But that name was 
not sold to IHC, Sports Medicine West, or any other third party. 
Consequently, there is no liability. 
2. No portion of the purchase price paid by IHC to acquire 
certain assets from Salt Lake City Knee and Sports Medicine Center 
were attributed to good will. Because no consideration was paid 
1 
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to acquire good will, plaintiff is not entitled to any recovery. 
As set forth below, the interpretation of these contract 
provisions is strictly a legal question properly resolved by 
summary judgment. Moreover, discovery is now concluded, and there 
are no disputed facts affecting these issues. Consequently, 
summary judgment should be entered as a matter of law. 
I . 
THE ISSUES PRESENTED ARE LEGAL ISSUES PROPERTY RESOLVED BY 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This Court should grant summary judgment when the record 
shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
•jthat the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" 
jUtah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Indeed the Utah Supreme Court has declared 
Ithat summary judgment shall be rendered under these circumstances: 
, i 
jj Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
JI Procedure, summary judgment shall be rendered 
i if the record demonstrates that "there is no 
ji • genuine issue as to any material fact and 
I that the moving party is entitled to 
! judgment as a matter of law. 
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added). 
Suummary judgment serves a salutary purpose in promoting 
judicial efficiency and avoiding unnecessary trials by permitting 
the parties to pierce the pleadings and determine whether there 
Mare genuine issues to present to the fact finder. 
A major purpose of summary judgment is to 
avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the 
parties to pierce the pleadings to determine 
whether there is a genuine issue to present 
2 
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to the fact finder. In accordance with this 
purpose, specific facts are required to show 
whether there is a genuine issue for trial. 
The allegations of a pleading or factual 
conclusions of an affidavit are insufficient 
to raise a genuine issue of fact. 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising. Inc. v. Lundgrenr 692 P.2d 776, 779 
(Utah 1984); Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d at 1172 (Utah 1983)(a major 
of purpose of summary judgment is to allow the pierce the 
pleadings to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact). 
Even, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute 
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly 
supported motion." Anderson v. Liberty Lobbyr Inc.f 477 U.S. 242, 
247-48 (1986) (emphasis by Court). Instead, summary judgment is 
mandated if "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion 
j...party ... fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 
.'existence of an element essential to that parties case, on which 
i I 
11 that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. 
siv. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 
11 In moving for summary judgment, the movant need not 
i 
! affirmatively demonstrate the absence of elements critical to the 
| Plaintiff"s case. Instead, the non-moving party has the burden 
| to come forward with evidence demonstrating the elemental 
I requirements of its case. 
J [W]e do not think the Adickes language 
quoted above should be construed to mean 
that the burden on the party moving for 
summary judgment to produce evidence 
showing the absence of a genuine issue 
of material fact, even with respect to 
an issue on which the non-moving party 
3 
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bears the burden of proof. Instead, as 
we have explained, the burden on the 
moving party may be discharged by 
"showing" — that is, pointing out to the 
District Court — that there is an 
absence of evidence to support the non-
moving party's case. 
Id. at 325 (emphasis added). 
There are no disputed issues of fact on either of the grounds 
on which this summary judgment motion is based. The issues 
presented are contract issues. The contract language is clear and 
unambiguous and speaks for itself. Consequently, it is construed 
as a matter of law. Morris v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 
658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1983): 
The interpretation of a contract is a 
question of law, to be decided by the judge, 
. . . 
More importantly, our recent cases hold that 
even the resolution of contract ambiguities 
is a question of law for the court. 
For that reason, summary judgment is a particularly 
appropriate and helpful tool in this contract litigation. Indeed, 
the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the use of summary 
judgment in contract cases. 
When the existence of a contract and the 
identity of its parties are not in issue and 
when the contract provisions are clear and 
complete, the meaning of the contract can 
appropriately be resolved by the court on 
summary judgment. 
Id. at 1201 (emphasis added). 
4 
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i 
II. 
THE NAME "SALT LAKE SPORTS MEDICINE CENTER" 
WAS NEVER SOLD TO IHC OR SPORTS MEDICINE WEST. 
Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement is the operative 
provision that determines and specifies under what circumstances 
plaintiff was entitled to any payment in the event Salt Lake 
Sports Medicine Center was sold to a third party. That provision 
provides in pertinent part: 
It is agreed that if within two (2) years 
from the date of this Agreement, [defendant 
Salt Lake Knee and Sports Medicine Center] 
sells the [Salt Lake Sports Medicine] Center 
to any third party, [plaintiff, Salt Lake 
Knee and Sports Rehabilitation, Inc.] shall 
be entitled to one-third (1/3) of that 
portion of the purchase price which is 
attributable to good will. 
(Paragraph 11 then defines the term "sale" as it is used in that 
;(paragraph. It specifies that a "sale" does not occur unless the 
: i 
i j 
I name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" is sold to the third party. 
|| "Sale" shall be defined as a transfer wherein 
the purchaser acquires and pays consideration 
I for all of the following: . . . ownership of 
the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center," 
....[emphasis added] 
The fact that ownership of the name "Salt Lake Sports 
I Medicine Center" was never sold to IHC or the joint venture, 
Sports Medicine West, is undisputed. Plaintiff, through one of 
its partners and principals, Douglas Toole, admitted in his 
deposition that he doesn't know whether the name Salt Lake City 
Sports Medicine Center was sold to IHC or Sports Medicine West. 
Toole Deposition at 85, attached as Exhibit lfD". Mr. Toole's 
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business associate, and the President of Plaintiff, Salt Lake Knee 
and Sports Rehabilitation, Inc., Gregory Gardner, concedes the 
same fact. He testified in his deposition that Plaintiff is not 
entitled to any recovery unless the name "Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center" is sold to a third party. He then admitted that 
he is not aware of any document or writing indicating the name 
i"Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" was sold. G. Gardner 
Deposition at 41, attached as Exhibit "C." 
Q. And in order for this paragraph 11 [of 
the Termination Agreement] to be 
triggered, it is true, is it not, that 
your understanding that the name Salt 
| Lake Sports Medicine Center had to be 
i sold the third party and used by the 
third party after the sale? 
| A. That's correct. 
J Q. Now, can you point to any document or 
I writing in which you are aware that the 
I name Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center 
was sold by Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
Center to IHC as part of the transaction 
that followed in May of 1990? 
A. No, I couldn't tell you that. 
G. Gardner Deposition at 41. 
Consequently, Plaintiff had no factual basis to dispute the issue 
of whether the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine" was sold. 
In striking contrast, the testimony of Dr. Lonnie Paulos, a 
principal in Salt Lake Knee and Sports Medicine and a partner in 
Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center, eliminates all doubt on the 
issue. He testifies that the Defendant, Salt Lake City Knee and 
Sports Medicine, never sold the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
5 
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Center" or otherwise conveyed that name to IHC, Sports Medicine 
West, or any other third party: 
11. Neither the name "Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center" nor any interest 
therein was sold or otherwise conveyed 
to IHC or any third party. 
Affidavit of Dr. Paulos at Jll. 
These facts are uncontested and discovery is now closed. By 
the express terms of the contract, plaintiff's entitlement to one-
third (1/3) of that portion of the purchase price which is 
attributable to good will arises only if the sale of the name 
."Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" occurred. Because that sale did 
not occur, plaintiffs have no right to any recovery. 
Consequently, the Court can and should determine as a matter of 
illaw that the provisions of paragraph 11 relied on by Plaintiff are 
Hnot triggered. For that reason, summary judgment is mandated as 
ija matter of law. 
I "III. 
I NO PORTION OF THE PURCHASE PRICE IS 
| ATTRIBUTED TO GOODWILL, 
A second basis for summary judgment exists that was not 
previously raised or addressed by the Court of Appeals. Under the 
controlling language of paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement, 
Plaintiff is entitled to a recovery only if some portion of the 
purchase price paid for the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center 
assets is attributed to goodwill. Discovery is concluded and the 
record is now clear, and without dispute, that no portion of the 
6 
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purchase price for the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center assets was 
attributed to good will. 
The deposition testimony of Greg Gardner and Douglas Toole, 
the principals of plaintiff, demonstrates unequivocally that they 
have no personal knowledge or information that any portion of the 
purchase price paid by IHC to acquire assets of the Salt Lake 
Sports Medicine Center were attributed to good will. Toole 
Deposition at 88. Mr. Toole testified he doesn't know, and has no 
idea what portion of the purchase price was attributable to 
goodwill. 
Because the principal of the Plaintiff, has admitted he has 
no knowledge or information concerning whether any goodwill was 
;|allocated to the sale of assets of Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
•Center, the testimony of Dr. Lonnie Paulos, the principal of the 
i ! 
jlentity selling the assets, stands uncontroverted and undisputed. 
NDr. Paulos testifies and confirms that no portion of the purchase 
|'price received from IHC was attributed to goodwill. 
i j 
| 12. IHC did not identify or value any goodwill 
I associated with any assets in which it 
I acquired an interest from Salt Lake Sports 
| Medicine Center, nor did it allocate any 
I portion of the $662,225.00 purchase price to 
I goodwill associated therewith. 
13. As part of the Asset Purchase Agreement 
with IHC, Dr. Rosenberg and I were required to 
sign a non-competition agreement pursuant to 
which we agreed that we would not compete with 
I IHC or with the medical practices being 
purchased by IHC from us. 
14. I was principally involved in negotiating 
the Asset Purchase Agreement with IHC. It was 
7 
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my intent and understanding in negotiating and 
executing that agreement that any multiples 
paid by IHC to acquire an interest in 
practices that Dr. Rosenberg and I maintained 
at the aforesaid clinics, and any related 
assets, was in consideration for the patients 
and practices that Dr. Rosenberg and I 
maintained at the Eighth Avenue Clinic and the 
Park City Clinic and for the execution by us 
of the aforesaid non-competition agreement. 
15. No part of the purchase price paid by IHC 
to acquire an undivided one-half interest in 
the practices and clinics maintained and 
operated by Dr. Rosenberg and me were 
allocated to any goodwill involving the Salt 
Lake Sports Medicine Center. 
Affidavit of Dr. Paulos at 5112-15. 
It is undisputed: No portion of the purchase price, was 
Mattributed to good will. Consequently, Plaintiff is not entitled 
i ! 
11to any recovery. It is that simple. Because there is no genuine 
jjdispute on any material issue of fact with respect to this issue, 
11 summary judgment can and should be entered as a matter of law. 
II CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, defendants respectfully 
move the Court for its Order granting summary judgment dismissing 
the above-captioned matter as a matter of law. 
DATED this ^ r ^ a y of December, 1997. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
ROBERT S. C A M P B S U U ^ S K ; — ' ^ — \ ' 
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
8 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the 
law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, One Utah Center, Thirteenth 
Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, and 
that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
DEPENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OP POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served upon: 
John C. Green, Esq. 
Kim M. Luhn, Esq. 
GREEN & LUHN, P.C. 
722 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
by U. S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
DATED this^j^C day of December, 1997. 
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Agreement dated this 'ff/^ day of 
1989, between Salt Lake Knee and Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. 
(hereinafter referred to as "Rehabilitation"} , and Salt Lake 
City Knee 6 Sports Medicine (hereinafter referred to as 
•physicians")• 
WHEREAS Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center 
(hereinafter referred to as "Medicine") and Rehabilitation 
entered into a Professional Services Contract and Lease -
Agreement dated September 23, 1987 (hereinafter referred to 
as the "Agreement"); and 
WHEREAS Medicine gave to Rehabilitation a Notice 
of Termination dated January 19, 198 9 pursuant to the terms 
of the Agreement; and 
WHEREAS Physicians is the successor in interest to 
Medicine; and 
WHEREAS Rehabilitation desires to sell to 
Physicians and Physicians desire to purchase from 
Rehabilitation certain equipment owned by Rehabilitation and 
currently located at the office of Rehabilitation at 670 
East 3 900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
Now, therefore, in consideration of the mutual 
covenants set forth below, the parties hereto agree as 
follows: 
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1. Termination, The Agreement is hereby 
terminated effective April 19, 1989, subject to the 
provisions of paragraph 13 of that Agreement, which by its 
terms survives the termination of the Agreement. 
2. Vacation of Premises, Rehabilitation shall 
vacate the premises at 6 70 East 3 900 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, (hereinafter referred to as the "Leased Premises") 
which is the subject of the Agreement, no later than Sunday, 
April 23, 1989 at 12:00 Midnight. 
3. Release of Claims. The parties hereto hereby 
release each other and their predecessors in interest and 
principals for all claims and liability to each other 
arising out of the Agreement or the parties' performance 
thereunder, except for any claims arising out of paragraph 
11 and paragraph 13 of the Agreement, which claims are 
specifically reserved by the parties. 
4. Sale of Equipment. Rehabilitation hereby 
sells to Physicians and Physicians hereby purchase from 
Rehabilitation that equipment owned by Rehabilitation and 
currently located at the "Leased Premises" which is set 
forth in Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein 
by reference (hereinafter referred to as the "Equipment"). 
5* Purchase Price. The purchase price for the 
Equipment shall be Thirty-Three Thousand Nine Hundred and 
Twenty-Nine Dollars ($3 3,929.00) and shall be paid to 
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Rehabilitation by Physicians in cash at the time of Closing, 
subject to the provisions of paragraph 7 below. 
6. Payment of Costs in Connection with Granite 
School District High School Sports Medicine Program, In 
addition to the purchase price for the Equipment, Physicians 
shall pay to Rehabilitation at Closing, subject to the 
provisions of paragraph 7 below, the sun of Six Thousand 
Dollars ($6,000.00)/ which represents reimbursement to 
Rehabilitation for costs incurred by Rehabilitation in 
connection with Rehabilitation's participation in Medicine's 
Granite School District High School Sports Medicine Program. 
7.- Liens and Encumbrances. It is understood by 
the parties that the Equipment is encumbered by a security 
interest held by West One Bank (as successor in interest of 
Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company) to secure payment of a 
current balance owing of Forty-One Thousand Three Hundred 
Eighty-One and 37/100 dollars ($41,381.37). In addition, it 
is understood that the Equipment, as well as certain 
equipment previously sold by Rehabilitation to Physicians 
(in approximately September of 1987) is encumbered by a 
security interest held by Capital City Bank (as successor in 
interest of Union Bank). Rehabilitation shall insure that 
those encumbrances are cleared and released in connection 
with the purchase hereunder. In that regard, it is 
understood that at Closing the payments to be made to 
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Rehabilitation shall be paid jointly to Rehabilitation and 
West One Bank. Rehabilitation shall then use those funds 
together with such of its own funds as necessary to 
immediately pay off the amount owing to West One Bank and 
procure and have filed a termination of West One's security 
interest against the Equipment. It is anticipated that the 
parties will together proceed directly from the Leased 
Premises to the West One Bank on the day of Closing to make 
certain that the above-described procedure is accomplished. 
8. Closing. Closing shall occur at the Leased. 
Premises at a time mutually agreeable to the parties, but in 
no event later than Friday, May 5, 1989 at 5:00 p.m. At 
closing, Physicians or their representative shall take a 
physical inventory of the Equipment. At closing, 
Rehabilitation shall provide to Physicians written 
verification from Capital City Bank (as successor in 
interest to Union Bank) that any liens or security interests 
that entity may have against the Equipment and against any. 
equipment Physicians or its partners may have previously 
purchased from Rehabilitation (including without limitation 
the physical therapy equipment located at 3 59 8th Avenue 
which was purchased in approximately September of 198 7) have 
been terminated. Upon verification of the presence of each 
item of Equipment, and upon receipt of the verification 
required above, Physicians shall deliver to Rehabilitation a 
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check made payable to Rehabilitation and West One Bank for 
the entire purchase price of the Equipment together with the 
payment referred to in paragraph 6 above. 
9. Warranties, Rehabilitation warrants that it 
owns the Equipment, free from any liens or encumbrances 
except those referred to in paragraph 7 above, and has the 
right to sell the same. Rehabilitation further warrants 
that all of the Equipment shall at the time of Closing be in 
good working condition and free from defects, 
10. Coin Toss Regarding Murray High School. 
Physicians and Rehabilitation acknowledge' that pursuant to 
paragraph 13 of the Agreement, the right to be involved in a 
Sports Medicine program at high schools which became a part 
of Medicine's High School Sports Medicine Program after the 
effective date of the Agreement would be determined by a 
toss of the coin. The parties agree that Murray High School 
fits into that category, and the parties therefore agree 
that at Closing a coin toss shall be conducted between 
Physicians and Rehabilitation, with the winner of that coin 
toss having the sole right to conduct a Sports Medicine 
Program at Murray High School, free from competition from 
the loser of that coin toss. 
11. Purchase of Center. It is agreed that if 
within two (2) years from the date of this Agreement, 
Physicians sells the Center to any third party, 
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Rehabilitation shall be entitled to one-third (1/3) of that 
portion of the purchase price which is attributed to good. 
will. "Sale" shall be defined as a transfer wherein the 
purchaser acquires and pays consideration for all of the 
following: The Center's lease on the Leased Premises, 
ownership of the name "Sale Lake Sports Medicine Center,' 
all of the equipment and other assets located at the Center, 
the Center's patients and accounts receivable/ and whereby 
the purchaser assumes complete operational control of the 
business of the Center and continues operating under the 
same name at the same location. 
12. Binding Agreement. This Agreement shall be 
binding on and inure to the benefit of the parties, and 
their heirs, successors, and assigns. 
13. Time. Time is of the essence of this 
Agreement. 
**• Attorneys Fees. Should any party default in 
or breach any of the covenants or agreements contained 
herein, the defaulting or breaching party shall pay all 
costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys fees, 
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which may accrue from enforc ing t h i s Agreement, or in 
pursuing any remedy provided hereunder, or by a p p l i c a b l e 
l aw. 
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS 
REHABILITATION, INC. 
By :-'*t< 
I t s s: =Sr 
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS 
MEDICINE, a Utah P a r t n e r s h i p 




L a a a l e / E ^ P a u l o ' s , P r e s . 
By THQtfAS-D. FOSENEERG, M.D., p.C. 
a Professional Corporation, 
' General Partner 
^ 
Ihtoas D. Roser±erg 
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557) 
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON (0099) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS 
REHABILITATION, INC., fka 
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS 
MEDICINE, a Utah general 
partnership, LONNIE E. PAULOS, 
M.D., P.C., a Utah 
professional corporation and 
THOMAS D. ROSENBURG, M.D., 
P.C, a Utah professional 
corporation, general partners, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
LONNIE E. PAULOS 
Civil No. 910906316 CN 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
;State of Utah ) 
ss. 
ICounty of Salt Lake ) 
| I, Lonnie E. Paulos, being first duly sworn depose and state 
!as follows: 
i 
j 1. I am a physician duly licensed in the state of Utah 
!specializing in the area of orthopedics. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. I am a principal in the professional corporation known as 
Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C. 
!•'. 3. At all time, material hereto, my professional corporation 
:
 has been a partner and principal in the partnership known as Salt 
Lake City Knee and Sports Medicine, along with the professional 
;."corporation of Dr. Thomas Rosenberg, known as Thomas D. Rosenberg, 
I'M.D. , P.C-
,| 4. Dr. Rosenberg and I, and our entity Salt Lake Knee and 
Sports Medicine maintained our primary practice and clinic in the 
medical building adjacent to the LDS Hospital on 8:~ Avenue in Salt 
Lake City (the "Eight Avenue Clinic"). We also maintained a clinic 
:in Park City ("Park City Clinic"). 
5. Dr. Rosenberg and I and another physican, Dr. Russell 
Toronto, were involved in a partnership known as the Salt Lake 
Sports Medicine Center. The partnership operated a clinic located 
: at 3900 South ("the 3900 South Clinic"). That clinic was primarily 
i ! 
joperated by Dr. Russell Toronto. Dr. Rosenberg and I, and our 
^entities, had very little involvement therewith and did not 
jmaintain a significant practice at the 3900 South Clinic. 
jj 6. On or about September 23, 1987, Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
! i 
jjCenter leased space at 3900 South to Salt Lake Knee and Sports 
i'Rehabilitation, Inc., whose principals were Gregory Gardner and 
!! 
jjDouglas Toole . 
|j 
jj 7. The relationship was strictly a landlord/tenant 
!(relationship. Neither Salt Lake Knee and Sports Rehabilitation, 
I Inc., Gardner, Toole, nor any employee or agent thereof was a Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i I 
principal, shareholder, partner, employee, agent, or representative 
of Salt Lake Sports Medicine, or of Dr. Rosenberg or me, or any 
entity of which we were a part. 
:' 8. On or about May 22, 1989, the lease of Salt Lake Knee and 
Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. at 3900 South was terminated by mutual 
agreement pursuant to a Termination Agreement and Purchase 
Agreement of that same date. Pursuant to that Termination 
Agreement and Purchase Agreement certain equipment of Salt Lake 
Knee and Sports Rehabilitation, Inc., were acquired by Salt Lake 
Knee and Sports Medicine. 
9. However, Gregory Gardner, Douglas Toole and their entity 
Salt Lake City Knee and Sports Medicine, Inc., took with them the 
name of their entity, their patients, and their practice, and 
relocated to another location. 
10. Pursuant to an Asset Purchase Agreement dated May 24, 
1990, Salt Lake Knee and Sports Medicine sold to IHC Hospitals, 
•Inc., ("IHC") a one-half (1/2) interest in the medical practice 
maintained by Dr. Rosenberg and me, at the Eighth Avenue Clinic and 
ithe Park City Clinic. We also sold to IHC a one-half interest in 
'certain assets and equipment maintained at the 3900 South Clinic. ! 
!;The practice that we maintained at that location was very small, 
jiand the practice of Dr. Russell Toronto, which was the primary 
ijpractice operated at 3900 South Clinic was not sold to IHC. 
M 
i! 11. Neither the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" nor 
i i 
j| .{ 
jiany i n t e r e s t there in was sold or otherwise conveyed to IHC or any 
IIthird par ty . 
II 3 
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12. IHC did not identify or value any goodwill associated 
iwith any assets in which it acquired an interest from Salt Lake 
Sports Medicine Center, nor did it allocate any portion of the 
$662,225.00 purchase price to goodwill associated therewith. 
13. As part of the Asset Purchase Agreement with IHC, Dr. 
Rosenberg and I were required to sign a non-competition agreement 
'pursuant to which we agreed that we would not compete with IHC or 
with the medical practices being purchased by IHC from us. 
14. I was principally involved in negotiating the Asset 
Purchase Agreement with IHC. It was my intent and understanding in 
negotiating and executing that agreement that any multiples paid by 
IHC to acquire an interest in practices that Dr. Rosenberg and I 
maintained at the aforesaid clinics, and any related assets, was in 
consideration for the patients and practices that Dr. Rosenberg and 
I maintained at the Eighth Avenue Clinic and the Park City Clinic 
and for the execution by us of the aforesaid non-competition 
, agreement. 
15. No part of the purchase price paid by IHC to acquire an 
;undivided one-half interest in the practices and clinics maintained 
and operated by Dr. Rosenberg and me were allocated to any goodwill 
:involving the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center. 
DATED this / ( day of December, 1997. 
LONNIE E. PAULOS 
/ 
S 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the 
law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, One Utah Center, Thirteenth 
Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, and that 
in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
LONNIE E. PAULOS was served upon: 
John C. Green, Esq. 
Kim M. Luhn, Esq. 
GREEN & LUHN, P.C. 
722 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
by Hand-Delivery on this day of December, 1997. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
CERTIFIED COPY 
Civil No. 910906316CN 
Deposition of: 
GREGORY J. GARDNER 
V O L U M E II 
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS 
REHABILITATION, INC., 




SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & 
SPORTS MEDICINE, a Utah 
general partnership, 
LONNIE E. PAULOS, M.D., 
P.C., a Utah professional 
corporation and THOMAS D. 
ROSENBERG, M.D., P.C., 




• * • 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 2nd day of 
December, 1997, the deposition of GREGORY J. GARDNER 
was taken before Shelly Van Tassell, Registered 
Professional Reporter, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. at the 
law offices of Campbell, Maack & Sessions, One Utah 
Center, Suite 1300, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
* • • 
Shelly Van Tassell 
, Registered Professional Reporter 
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• R E P O R T E R S -
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A 
Q 
I think so• 
And upon the termination of your relationship, 
in other words Rehab's relationship with Sports 1 
Medicine Center in May of 1989, did you and Toole i 
continue to provide services and therapy to the 






So you took those with you when you left, when 





We took the schools with us, the 
brought to the table. 
same ones that 
Right. You considered them to be your 







They were not our patients, but -
Your customers? 
Customers, sure. 
I thought it would be a kind way 
•-
to put it to 




No. We call them patients. 
And the patients that you had at the Sports 
Medicine Center, upon Rehab's termination of its 
agreement with the Center in May 19 89, did you take | 
39 
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those patients with you? 
A I believe most of the patients remained with 
us, yes. 
Q And where --
A The patients that we were treating at the time 
of termination, they completed their treatments with 
us at other locations. 
Q At other locations. 
A Right. 
Q Which ones? 
A Either at Jordan Valley Hospital or at that 
time Holy Cross Hospital. 
Q And that was under the name of the Physical 
Therapy or Professional Services -- Professional 
Therapy Clinic; is that right? 
A Right. 
Q Now, paragraph 11 of the termination and 
purchase agreement with the Center provided that in 
the event the Center was sold to a third party within 
a period of two years from the date of the agreement 
that one-third of the purchase price that was 
attributed to good will would be sent over to Rehab. 
Is that a fair characterization of the general 
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Q Did you understand when you sighed paragraph 11 
that in order for that paragraph to be operable that 
the name Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center was an 
important aspect of any such sale to a third party? 
A Right. Correct. 
Q And that in order for this paragraph 11 to be 
triggered, it is true, is it not, that it was your 
understanding that the name Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
Center had to be sold to the third party and used by 
the third party after the sale? 
A That's correct. 
Q Now, can you point to any document or any 
writing in which you are aware that the name Salt Lake 
Sports Medicine Center was sold by Sports Medicine 
Center to IHC as part of the transaction that followed 
in May of 1990? 
A No, I couldn't tell you that. 
Q You've seen the agreement, have you, or a copy 
of the agreement? 
A I have. 
Q The purchase agreement? 
A I have, yes. 
Q And by the purchase agreement, I mean the asset 
purchase agreement between the Center, Salt Lake Knee 
& Sports Medicine and IHC hospitals. 
41 






























I'll mark that as Exhibit 5. 
(Whereupon Exhibit No. 5 was 
marked for identification.) 
MR. CAMPBELL: John, I think you've got a copy 











(Off the record.) 
And is Exhibit 5 the document, sir, that you 
you have seen or reviewed? 
I've seen it. [ 
i 
When did you first see it? 
Well --
Your best recollection. 
I guess it was 1992 sometime. 
And what was the occasion in which you had to 
it? 
I believe our attorneys requested this 










You're talking about Mr. Green here. 
Yes. 
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1 I A Yup. 
2 I Q And have you reviewed various provisions of it 
3 | over the ensuing months while this case has been 
4 I pending? 
5 A I reviewed it -- it's been a long time. 
6 Q Now -- go ahead. 
7 A I haven't really recently read it, no. 
8 Q Looking at that agreement, is there any portion 
9 of that agreement in which you can point to in which 
10 IHC purchased the name Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
11 Center as part of the assets which it acquired when it 
12 purchased one-half of the Salt Lake Knee & Sports 
13 Medicine? Do you want to take some time? If you do, 
14 go ahead. 
15 A Sure. 
16 Q Why don't we do this. I want to keep you on 
17 the record in answering this question. I'll be happy 
18 to give you the time. I don't want to recess right 
19 now. Let's finish this question and then we will take 
20 whatever recess. 
21 A Okay. What am I looking for again? Ask me 
22 that again. 
23 Q You told me just a moment ago that you didn't 
24 know of any writing or any written document in which 
25 IHC had purchased the name Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
43 
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Center. 
A Okay. 
Q I've now shown you the exact agreement that you 
say you did see. And I'm saying, is there anything 
that you can point to in which there was a sale of the 
name Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center to IHC as a part 
of the purchase agreement between IHC and Drs. Paulos 
and Rosenberg? 
A I don't see the name Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
Center. 
Q Was it your understanding, Mr. Gardner, that, 
in fact, the name that was used by Sports Medicine 
Center and IHC in connection with the purchase 
represented by Exhibit 5 was called "Sports Medicine 
West?" 
A That was the company that -- that was the 
surviving company, as I understand it. 
Q And did you understand that after May 24, 1990, 
that the Sports Medicine Center and IHC had entered 
into a joint venture called Sports Medicine West? 
A All I knew was that there was a sale that 
included the 39th South facility. 
Q But was it your understanding that after May 
24, 1990, that Paulos and Rosenberg operated the 
Sports Medicine Center under the name Sports Medicine 
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LONNIE E. PAULOS, M.D., 
P.C., a Utah professional 
corporation and THOMAS D. 
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* * • 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 2nd day of 
December, 1997, the deposition of DOUGLAS B. TOOLE 
was taken before Shelly Van Tassell, Registered 
Professional Reporter, at the hour of 11:20 a.m. at the 
law offices of Campbell, Maack & Sessions, One Utah 
Center, Suite 1300, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake 
C£ty, Utah. 
• * * 
Shelly Van Tassell 
Registered Professional Reporter 
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Q You've never disclosed on any of those as an 












or Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center? 
No, I haven't. I didn't do it, because at that 
we hadn't received any benefit from it. 
You have no knowledge or information that the 
Salt Lake City Sports Medicine Center or Salt 
Sports Medicine Center was sold to IHC? 
I don't know that the name was sold, no. I 
that the company that we assumed we were running, 
Lake City Sports Medicine Center at 3900 South, 
entity was sold. How it was sold, I don't know. 
Your entity that was named Salt Lake Knee & 








Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehab? 
Yes. 
No. 
It was never sold to Paulos and Rosenberg? 
No. 
MR. ANDERSON: Why don't we take a break here. 
I'm7getting fairly close to finishing. Give me five 
minutes to go over my notes, and I don't think we will 
be any more than 15, 20, 30 minutes. 
(Recess.) 
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Professional Therapy Clinic, Inc. 
A I think that's how it went. We've got those 








When that merger occurred, do you know what 
ned to your stock in Salt Lake Knee & Sports 
? 
It was exchanged for stock. My understanding 
t was exchanged for stock in Professional 
py. It was all rolled into that company. 
Do you know if you continued to own the stock 




As far as I can remember, it became part of 
Professional Therapy. 
Q Did you receive any consideration or 










At the time that Rehab was an active 
ration, did Professional Therapy operate any 
-businesses or at any other business locations? 
-- Yes. 
Give me a background, if you would, on the 
different operations you had and locations and let me 
know how the corporations fit together. 
24 
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A Well, Professional Therapy Clinic, Inc. at that 
time was a separate corporation. It had a business at 
1002 East South Temple. And then we had a business at 
3590 West 90th South in West Jordan. 
Q Any others? 
A Not at that time. 
Q When you say at that time, what is the time 
frame you're referring to? 
A 1985 to 1987. 
Q To take a step back, Professional Therapy was 
incorporated in 1978 approximately, based on your 
prior testimony. 
A Yes. 
Q From 1978 to 1985 where did Professional 
Therapy operate its business? 
A 1002 East South Temple. 
Q What was the nature of the business? 
A Physical therapy. 
Q And 1002 East South Temple, is that a medical 
building? 
A The Moreau Medical Building. 
Q Is that associated with Holy Cross Hospital? 
A It was. 
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Yes. The bui 
tal. 
Okay. And wh 
lding was owned by Holy Cross 
ile Professional Therapy 






any contract or 
tal? 
It did, yes. 
What was the 
Contract was 










relationship with Holy Cross 
nature of that relationship? 
to provide outpatient physical 
the hospital. 
Does that contract still remain 
We still provide those services. 
een negotiated, 
, but we still 
To Holy Cross 
Its successor 




provide those services. 
Hospital or its successor? 
• 
Who is that now? 
Right now it 





No, we don't. 





During the pe 
is Paracelsus Health Care. 
operate, then, out of the Moreau 
provide the services to the 
riod, though, from 1978 through 
26 
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1987, Professional Therapy was operating offices in 
the Moreau Medical Building providing outpatient 
service to Holy Cross Hospital; is that right? 
A We were. Somewhere around 1987, 1988 we moved 
to a new location just half a block east. 
Q Where was that? 
A 24 South 1100 East in what's called the MedPlex 
Building. 
Q MedPlex? 
A MedPlex, uh-huh. 
Q Does Professional Therapy still have offices 
there? 
A No. 
Q How long did it have offices there? 
A For approximately five years. 
Q To give us some time frame on that, to the best 
of your recollection when did it cease maintaining its 
offices there? 
A Oh, approximately 1993. 1993, approximately. 
Q Why did it stop maintaining offices there? 
A The hospital wanted the space that we were in 
so they could bring more doctors into that medical 
office building, and they offered us an opportunity to 
move our facility into what is now Salt Lake Regional 
Medical Center. And so we chose to do that. 
27 
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Where is the Salt Lake Regional Medical Center 
ed? 
1050 East South Temple. The old Holy Cross 
tal. 
So rather than being in the MedPlex Building, 










Is Professional Therapy in the hospital now? 
Yes. 
So it's at that same location? 
It is. 
And continues to provide services, 
ilitation services, to hospital outpatients? 
Uh-huh. (Affirmative). We now provide 








You indicated that from 1985 to 1987 you also 
ted office space at 3590 West 90th South in West 
n; is that right? 
Yes. 
Was that business operated by Professional 





What was the nature of that business? 
Physical therapy. 
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happened in 1987 to that business 
still there. 
re still there? 
you still offer physical therapy there? 
other services? 
pational therapy and speech therapy. And 
audiology until November 1st of this year. 
you stop offering it at that time? 
is that? 
hose to let the two physicians that we did 
work for take that business. They brought 
ir business. 
they purchase it from you? 
' are assuming the equipment lease. 
any consideration paid other than the 
of that lease hold obligation? 
Where is that building? Is that associated 
a hosp 
It's 
>ital or a medical center? 
on the campus of Jordan Valley Hospital. 
Is that also owned by Paracelsus? 
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Who owns that hospital? 
Perry & Holmes, I believe, are the owners. 
Southwest Medical Partnership is who owns it, if I 











Are those individuals? 
That's a company, I believe, as far as I know. 
When you began leasing space there, was it 
as the Jordan Valley Hospital? 
Jordan Valley Holy Cross. 
When you officed there was it owned by Holy 
> 1 
The hospital was, yes. 
Did you have a contract with Holy Cross with 






We had in and outpatient rehab. 
At that location? 
At that location it was outpatient. 3590 West 
outpatient clinic. We provided inpatient in the 
hospital itself. 
Q At any time since 1978 has Professional Therapy 
operated any other clinics or businesses or had any 
other lease space? 
30 
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A I'm trying to think. We had a clinic in Park 
City. 
Q Where was that? 
A It was at the Prospector Athletic Club. 
Q Is that in Prospector Square? 
A Yes. It's right next to the Prospector Hotel. 
Q When did Professional Therapy take down that 
space? 
A Take it down or leave it? 
Q When did you start operating your business 
there? 
A Approximately February of '94. 
Q What is the nature of the business that's 
operated there? 
A Well, it's not there now. But it was physical 
therapy. 
Q Okay. So you started in 1994, February? 
A Yes. 
Q When did you cease doing business at that 
location? 
A June of '97. 
-Q------ Why did you cease doing business at that 
location? 
A We couldn't find what we felt was an adequate 
therapist to cover it and it was not making a profit, 
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py as a memb 
but it's a p 
, Colorado, 
Is that a 







got to think 
Let's back 
And then we joined Professional 
er as a 50 percent -- not 50 percent 
art ownership of Rehab Services of 
corporation? 
z, Colorado lie. 
t is the portion of the 
Eipy in that company? 
ownership of 
approximately three months ago, and 
. 
up. Why don't you tell 
Professional Therapy acquired an interest 














to think of the exact dates. It was 
-- that business started 
it was '93 or '94. It 
st go back here. 1994. 
in 19 -- I 
was one of 
So Professional Therapy acquired an interest in 
Services of 




Craig, Colorado in 1994 
recollection. 






Rehab Services of Craig, 
s a new company that we 
a new partnership, lie, 
sometime, to 
lly have any 
Colorado? 
formed at 
at that time. 
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Q When you say we formed the new lie, who are you 
referring to? 
A Mountain Land Physical Therapy and Professional 
Therapy. 
Q ' Professional Therapy you've identified and 
described already. What is or who is Mountain Land 
Physical Therapy? 
A Mountain Land Physical Therapy is a company in 
Salt Lake City that provides rehab services. 
Q Do you have any ownership interest in Mountain 
Land Physical Therapy? 
A No. 
Q Have you ever had an interest in that? 
A No. 
Q Does Mr. Gardner, to your knowledge? 
A No. 
Q Who owns Mountain Land Physical Therapy? 
A To my knowledge, it's Mark Anderson, Kent 
Montgomery and Jim Liken. 
Q Are they physical therapists? 
A They have different corporations, and I don't 
know if Jim Liken is an owner of Mountain Land 
Physical Therapy or Mountain Land Rehab. They have 
different corporations set in there. But Mr. Liken is 
an occupational therapist. 
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And are the other two physical therapists? 
Physical therapists. 
And so their corporate entity or entities and 
corporate entity, Professional Therapy, each 
acquired an interest in Rehab Services of Craig, 







In fact, those two entities set up and created 
Services of Craig, Colorado; is that accurate? 
Yes. 
Do they each have a 50 percent ownership 
interest in Rehab Services of Craig, Colorado? 
A Not at this time. Like I said, we purchased a 
company there, and now I think we have less than 50 
percent ownership. 
Q At the time Rehab Services of Craig, Colorado 
was set up as an lie though, did your entity, 




?y entity each own half interest? 
Yes. 
And since that time the ownership interest has 
changed. When did that occur and why? 
A It occurred approximately August or September 
of 1997. An exact date I don't know right off. I 
would have to look at the records. 
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So just a few months ago. 
Rehab Services of Craig purchased Function 
Colorado. I don't know whether it was an lie 
or corporation. And an individual with Function Works 
acquired in that transaction a percentage ownership of 
Rehab 
Q 
Services of Craig. 
So since the acquisition of Function Works, has 
Function Works held an equal interest in Rehab 








No. We purchased Function Works. We just 
the assets of the company. 
Okay. 
And then one of the owners of Function Works 
an owner of Rehab Services of Craig. 
What was his ownership interest? 
Her ownership. And I believe it's 
approximately, don't hold me to this, but 
approx 
Q 
imately 20 percent. 
And does Professional Therapy and Mountain Land 






So, to the best of your knowledge, do they each 
40 percent interest and then this woman owns 20 
percent? 
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What is her name? 
Her name is Val Perkins, 
Is she a resident of Craig, Colorado? 
She is. 
What is her occupation? 
Physical therapist. 
What is the nature of the business of Function 
? 
Provided physical therapy and 
py services. 
occupational 
Was that a physical therapy clinic that she 
and operated? 
Well, it was a company. They had a clinic and 
they also provided home health services. 
Did she own the company? 
She was part owner, yes. 
When the company was acquired, 
Services of Craig, Colorado begin to 
did Rehab 
offer home health 
services or was that aspect of the business 
discontinued? 
A No. We were in that business, 
in that business. 
Q When you say you were in that 
you referring to? 
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Any other businesses that Professional Therapy 
been involved in since its inception in 1978? 
Not Professional Therapy. I'm trying to think 
they all fit together. Not as Professional 
Therapy Clinic, Inc., no. 
Q 
invc 
So Professional Therapy Clinic, Inc. has been 
)lved at the locations you've described and the 




. of your knowledge. 
Not as Professional Therapy Clinic. 
Gardner and I have been involved in some other 







Now, with respect to the other businesses that 
and Mr. Gardner have been involved, if you'd 
.ine those for me. 
Well, we have an lie, D&G Therapy. 
D&G? 
Uh-huh. (Affirmative). That's been an owner 





When did you and Mr. Gardner form D&G Therapy? 
1994. 
And are you equal owners? 
Yes. 
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Q Are there any other owners? 
A No, 
Q So you each own 50 percent of that company? 
A Yes. 
Q And that company, did it acquire Western 
Therapy Associates? 
A It helped form Western Therapy Associates. 
Q Does D&G Therapy own Western Therapy 
Associates? 
A Owns one-third of it. 
Q Is Western Therapy Associates a corporation? 
A I believe it's an lie. 
Q Who are the other owners? 
A Rocky Mountain Physical Therapy and Mountain 
Land. 
Q Where does Western Therapy Associates operate 
its business? 
A Its corporate offices are at the Mountain Land 
offices in Salt Lake City. 
Q What's that? 
A I'd have to look it up. I don't know exactly. 
It's in Midvale. 
Q So the corporate offices are there? 
A Yes. 
Q Does it maintain a clinic somewhere? 
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Western Therapy did until approximately the 
of October when it sold its assets to Rocky 




That was in October of this year? 
Uh-huh. (Affirmative). Now, there's also a 
Western Therapy Associates, Nevada that is again owned 
in part 25 percent by Rocky Mountain, Mountain Land 
and Professional Therapy. And then the remaining 25 




Okay. Now, you said that 25 percent of Western 
Therapy was owned by --
A 
Q 
Western Therapy, Nevada. 
Yeah, thank you. So 25 percent of that entity 
! was owned by Professional Therapy* 
A 
Q 
No, by D&G Therapy. 
Okay. The Rocky Mountain entity that owns 25 
percent of Western Therapy, Nevada, is that the same 
Rocky Mountain entity that acquired the assets of 
Western Therapy Associates in Utah? 
A They acquired the assets of the two clinics in 
Oregon that we were operating. 
Q Okay. So Western Therapy Associates, did it 
operate clinics in Oregon and Nevada or just Oregon? 
A It operated clinics in Oregon and Utah, 
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Q Okay. And the assets of Weste 
subsequently sold to Rocky Mountain? 
A 
rn Therapy were 
The clinic locations. The assets a tnd clinics 
that were in Oregon -- Lakeview, Oregon and Burns, 
Oregon 
Q 
-- were sold to Rocky Mountain 
What is the nature of the enti 









I believe it is. I don't know 
. 
Does it operate in Oregon? 
It's a Utah corporation. 
It's a Utah corporation? 
Uh-huh. (Affirmative). 
Who are the principals? 
There's six or seven of them. 
1
 deal mostly with is Paul Wartley. 
Q 
' A 
Is he a physical therapist? 
He is. And Jim Wartley is an 











owner. And how 
Id have to look 
Let me just see if I can summarize 
tanding is of this entity and maybe 
questions. As I understand it, then, 
an lie that you and Mr. Gardner own, 






of you own 
4 0 J 
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And that entity in turn acquired a one-third 




Which had clinics both in Utah and Oregon when 




No. When it was first started the only clinics 
in Oregon. 
Okay. So when D&G acquired its interest 






Subsequent to the acquisition of Western 












one, Mountain Land? 
Uh-huh. (Affirmative). 
Western Therapy set up some clinics in Utah as 
is that right? 
They set up a clinic in St. George. 
And that was a rehab clinic, physical therapy 
c. . 
Physical therapy clinic. 
And then, as I understand it, Rocky Mountain 
red the assets of Western Therapy Associates. 
No. It acquired the Oregon assets. 
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Okay. The Utah assets 
George rehab facility and 
inued to be owned by D&G, 








Is that true today? 
It is. 
And it continues to op< 
George? 






Does it operate any cl 
, in other words the 
therapy facility, 
Rocky Mountain and 
owner; is that right? 
» i 
srate its clinic in 
not operating that 
inics now? 
Western Therapy Associates doesn't operate, per 
but we have Western Therapy Associates in Nevada 
is still operating a clinic in Mesquite and 
Overton. 
Q Now, Western Therapy o 









Is it an lie? 
Yes. 
How is that owned? 
f Nevada or Western 
is that a separate legal 
- I 
25 percent Rocky Mountain, 25 percent Mountain 
Land, 25 percent D&G Therapy, and 25 percent --
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These two individuals. 
These two individuals in Nevada. 
And that is an ongoing active entity and it has 








Was that entity also formed in 1994? 
No. That was formed later. I don't know the 
date on that, but that was formed at a later 
But it was formed by the four people that owned 
the stock or are the owners of that company. 
A 
Q 
It was, yes. 
Do you and Mr. Gardner own any other businesses 












Industrial Physical Therapy. 
What is the nature of that entity? 
Sub S corporation. 
Utah corporation? 
Yes. 
What is the nature of its business? 
Physical therapy and occupational therapy. 
Does it operate any clinics? 
Yes. 
Where does it operate? 
43 





It operates at 441 
Is that a medical 




building or hospital? 
medical office building. 
What is the ownership interest that you and 









You each own 50 percent? 
Yes, 
No other owners? 
No. 
The nature of the 




Is there a reason 
separately? 
A Yes. I started th 









time -- pardon? 
Excuse me, I didn' 
was it started? 




why you incorporated that 
e company with Jim Jukes, 
time we started it. 
t mean to interrupt 
I think 1982. Approximately 1982. 
And has it been op 
date? 
It has. 







his involvement with 
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the company? 
A I don't know the exact date. But he sold his 
25 percent interest to Mr. Gardner and then I sold 25 
percent interest of my stock to Mr. Gardner. 
Q So prior to that time you owned 75 percent 
interest? 
A Yes. 
Q What did you receive in consideration for 
selling your stock, the 25 percent or half of your 
stock rather? 
A Well, I only sold 25 percent of my stock. 
Q Well, you owned --
A .75 percent. And I sold 25 percent. I still 
own 50. 
Q Okay. What did you receive for selling 25 
percent of your stock? 
A Somewhere in the neighborhood of at that time 
60- to $65,000. I don't know the exact amount. 
Q And did Mr. Jukes receive the same amount for 
his 25 percent ownership? 
A That I don't know. 
Q Did you sell it at the same time? 
A We did. 
Q When did that sale occur, approximately, to the 
best of your recollection? 
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A 1990, 1991, approximately. I don't know that 
for sure without looking at the documents. 
Q Okay. Are there any other entities in which 
you or Mr. Gardner have had an interest? 
A< Not that I can recall. 
Q So those that you've described on the record 
here this afternoon, to the best of your knowledge 
those are the entities in which.you've been involved 
since you began your career as a physical therapist; 
is that fair to say? 
A Yeah, it is. 
Q The Industrial Physical Therapy company that 
you just described, you indicated what their address 
is. Has it operated at any other address? 
A It hasn't. 
Q So it's been there since its inception and it 
continues to operate there? 
A Well, it provides services for Salt Lake 
Industrial Clinic, and that clinic has changed 
locations. We've always been at that clinic's 
location. So it hasn't been at 441 South Redwood Road 
during its entirety, but wherever Salt Lake Industrial 
Clinic has been located it's been in that clinic. 
Q Have you also provided physical therapy 
services for certain high schools in the greater Salt 
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PROFESSIONAL SERVICES CONTRACT 
and 
LEASE AGREEMENT 
AGREEMENT made this J3^ day of ^ p i ^ U 
1987, between SALT LAKE SPORTS MEDICINE CENTER, a Utah 
Partnership/ comprised of Thomas D, Rosenberg M.D., a 
Professional Corporation, Lonnie E, Paulos, M.D., Inc., a 
Professional Corporation, and Russell A. Toronto M.D., 
(hereinafter referred to as "Medicine"), and SALT LAKE KNEE 
and SPORTS REHABILITATION, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
(hereinafter referred to as "Rehabilitation".) 
WHEREAS Medicine operates a sports medicine 
center at 670 East 3900 South in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Center*;, and 
WHEREAS Medicine desires to make available to its 
patients professional physical ..therapy services at the 
Center, and 
WHEREAS Rehabilitation is organized for the 
purpose of rendering physical therapy services by registered 
professional pnysical therapists who are qualified and 
registered under the laws of the State of Utah to prcvide 
professional physical therapy services, and 
WHEREAS Rehabilitation is desirous of providing 
professional physical therapy services to Medicine's 
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at and for the Center operated by Medicine upon the terms 
and conditions contained in this Contract and Agreement. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual 
covenants, conditions, duties and responsibilities contained 
herein, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
1. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR STATUS. The parties 
intend that an independent contractor-employer relationship 
will be created by this Contract and Agreement. No agent, 
employer, or servant of Rehabilitation shall be or shall be 
deemed to be the employee, agent, or servant of Medicine. 
Medicine is interested only in the results obtained under 
.this Contract and Agreement. The manner and means of 
conducting the work are under the sole control of 
Rehabilitation. None of the benefits provided by Medicine 
to its employees, including, but not limited to health, 
worker's compensation, and unemployment insurance and 
pension plans, are available from Mecicir.e to the employees, 
agents or servants of Rehabilitation. Rehabilitation will 
be solely and entirely responsible for its acts and for the 
acts of its agents, employees, and servants during the 
performance of this Contract and Agreement, and Medicine 
shall be solely responsible for the acts and/or omissions of 
its officers, partners, agents or employees. 
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2. LEASED SPACE. Medicine shall provide to 
Rehabilitation office space within Medicine's Sports 
Medicine Center at 670 East 3900 South in Salt Lake Cityf 
Utah, which office space shall contain at least 2,000 square 
feet. Said space shall be built-out and ready for occupancy 
in a manner suitable for use as a physical therapy treatment 
center. By signing this Contract and Agreement, 
Rehabilitation acknowledges the space is sufficiently built 
out and suitably ready for occupancy. 
3. RENT. Rehabilitation shall pay rent to 
Medicine for such office space an amount equal to One 
Thousand One Hundred Sixty Seven and 00/100 Dollars 
($1,167.00) per month, which rent shall be due and payable 
in advance on the first day of each calendar month during 
the term of this Contract and Agreement. 
Provided however, that in the event that 
Medicine's lease arrangement with IHC Hospitals, Inc. d/b/a 
LDS Hospital is changed or modified in the future, or when 
the underlying lease vith F.C. Stangl H I is renegotiated, 
Rehabilitation shall be required to adjust the amount 
payable as rent hereunder to equal one-half (1/2) of the 
rental which Medicine is required to pay on the Center. 
4. UTILITIES AND JANITORIAL, AND MAINTENANCE. 
Rehabilitation, in addition to the rent obligation described 
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in paragraph 3 hereof, shall also pay one-half (1/2) of all 
utility and janitorial costs of the Center, and of all other 
maintenance costs which are related to or benefit the Center 
as a whole. Each party shall be responsible for payment of 
all maintenance or repair costs related solely to its own 
space. Said share of utility, janitorial and maintenance 
payments shall be reimbursed by Rehabilitation to Medicine 
within fifteen (15) days after Rehabilitation is advised in 
writing by Medicine of the amount due. 
5. SERVICES PROVIDED. Rehabilitation shall 
provide professional physical therapy and other physical 
rehabilitation services to patients at the Center. Said 
services shall be provided in a timely manner and shall be 
of a quality commensurate with"the highest standards of 
physical therapy services provided by registered physical 
therapists in the intermountain region of the United States. 
6. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT. Rehabilitation shall 
provide at its discretion and expense, such personnel and 
equipment as is necessary to provide the services referred 
to in the preceding paragraph. There shall be no sharing of -
personnel between Medicine and Rehabilitation unless agreed 
to in writing in a separate document reflecting all terms of 
such sharing. 
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7. ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE. Rehabilitation shall 
bill and collect for all services it provides -o patients 
for whom it has provided services and all such collections 
shall be the sole and exclusive property of Rehabilitation. 
All billings for services by either Rehabilitation or 
Medicine shall be done separately. 
8. OUTSIDE REFERRALS. Rehabilitation shall have 
the right to accept patient referrals from other sources, 
and to provide physical therapy and rehabilitation services 
to its own patients at the Center. 
9. REPRESENTATIONS TO PU3LIC. Neither party 
shall make any representations to patients or the general 
public which would reasonably lead patients or the general 
public to believe that Rehabilitation or any of its 
employees is an agent, employee cr servant cf or a partner 
or joint venturer with the Partnership or the Center. 
Rehabilitation shall separately identify with appropriate 
signage and other necessary action, the office space which 
it rents pursuant to Paragraph 2 abovef to indicate that it 
is a separate business and operation frcm Center. All 
correspondence from Rehabilitation to its patients shall be 
done on letterhead of Rehabilitation. 
10. SPECIAL PROJECTS. Rehabilitation shall 
prcvide such physical therapy support and personnel as are 
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necessary to enable Medicine to effectively administer its 
Agreement with Granite School District to provide a sports 
medicine program for the District, and to enable Medicine to 
effectively administer such other high school sports 
medicine programs as it may become involved in. 
Provided that Medicine hereby agrees tc bear 
two-thirds (2/3) of all costs directly attributable to 
supplying personnel and/cr equipment for the above described 
special programs, lectures, training and demonstrations, and 
Rehabilitation shall bear one-third (1/3) cf said costs. 
Provided further that the parties shall decide in 
advance the costs which will be deemed attributable to the 
providing of services as set forth in this paragraph* 
It is understood that the time cf physicians and 
physical therapists which is spent in attending, supporting 
and administering the special programs, lectures, training, 
and demonstrations, shall be considered volunteer time and 
there shall be no reimbursement for their time or sharing of 
their salaries for such time pursuant tc the above cost 
sharing provisions. 
Subject to Medicine's overall control cf the 
special high school sports medicine program, Rehabilitation 
shall supervise all athletic trainers or physical therapists 
while at any school and operating under the program* 
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Rehabilitation shall at Medicine1 s request cooperate and 
fully participate in publishing of a newsletter dealing with 
sports medicine topics, which relates to the high schocl 
program and which shall be distributed to high schools and 
to patients of the parties hereto. 
11. INDEMNIFICATION. Each party shall indemnify 
the other and hold harmless their respective partners, 
agents, employees, officers, directors and shareholders and 
partners' shareholders against any claim, liability or loss 
suffered as the result of services provided by a party, its 
partners, officers, directors, employees or agents. 
12. TERM. The term of this Contract and Agreement 
shall run until September 30, 1988. The Contract and 
Agreement shall be automatically renewed for succeeding one 
(1) year terms unless and until it is terminated in writing 
by one of the parties as provided below. Either party shall 
be entitled to terminate this Contract and Agreement with or 
without cause by giving the other party ninety (90) days 
written notice. 
13. COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE. Rehabilitation, 
GREGORY J. GARDNER (hereinafter referred to as "Gardner") 
and DOUGLAS B. TOOLE (hereinafter referred to as "Toole"), 
shall be prohibited from rendering physical therapy services 
within a five ;5) city block radius of the Center for a 
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period of two years from the date of termination of this 
Contract and Agreement, and shall not, for a period of two 
(2) years from the date of termination, provide physical 
therapy services to any patient that was originally a 
referral from Medicine and was under treatment at the Center 
at the time of termination. 
With regard to the High School Sports Medicine 
Programs described in. Paragraph 10 above, it is agreed by 
the parties that at the termination of this Contract and 
Agreement (whether by its terms or by either party for any 
reason), Rehabilitation, Gardner and Toole shall be 
prohibited from competing with Medicine in any sports 
medicine program involving Granite School District or any of 
its schools, and Medicine shall- be prohibited from competing 
with Rehabilitation in any sports medicine program involving 
any of the following high schools: Judge Memorial, Jordan, 
West Jordan, Davis, North Summit, ar.d South Summit. Any 
schools other than those set forth above, which become part 
of Medicine's school program prior to the termination of 
this Contract and Agreement, shall be divided evenly between 
Medicine and Rehabilitation at the termination of the 
Contract and Agreement. The parties shall toss a coin with 
the winner of the coin tcss having its first choice of 
schools and the parties then alternating choices ur.til all 
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the schools have been chosen* Tn the event there is an 
uneven number of schools involved, the final school shall be 
assigned by a toss of the coin. Once the schools have been 
divided, the parties agree not to compete with the other in 
sport9 medicine programs involving their respective schools. 
The above-described covenant not to compete shall 
be in effect for a period of two (2) years following the 
termination of this /agreement. 
If the covenant net to compete is enforced, it 
must be enforced against all named individuals or will be 
null and void as against all individuals. 
It is hereby expressly agreed by the parties that 
this non-competition clause is a material part of this 
Agreement, and but for this restrictive covenant, the 
parties would not be willing to enter into this Agreement. 
14. POSSIBLE SALE OF CENTER. The parties 
acknowledge that the combination of the two services within 
one facility is and will be a dynamic method to provide 
necessary services to patients of both Medicine and 
Rehabilitation. 
The parties further acknowledge that the trend in 
the industry is to have centers such as the one established 
by Medicine and Rehabilitation be purchased by full service 
hospitals. 
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In the event that an offer to purchase the Center 
is received from any third party, Medicine hereby agrees not 
to sell the Center unless the purchaser also agrees to 
purchase the operation being conducted by Rehabilitation at 
the Center including its leasehold interest as expressed 
herein, together with goodwill, etc. Provided that 
Rehabilitation shall be solely responsible for the terms 
including price for the purchase of its own assets such as 
accounts receivable and equipment. Rehabilitation agrees to 
bargain in good faith in setting the purchase price and 
terms on any such purchase. 
The parties agree that any combined amount paid 
for the goodwill of the respective parties shall be 
aggregated and divided between the parties, with Medicine 
receiving two-thirds of the total amount and Rehabilitation 
one-third. 
15. BINDING AGREEMENT. This Contract and 
Agreement shall be binding on and inure to the benefit of 
the parties, and their heirs, representatives, successors, 
and assigns, and supercedes all other agreements relating to 
the Center previously entered into between the parties. 
16. ATTORNEYS FEES. Should any party default in 
or breach ar.y of the covenants or agreements contained 
herein, the defaulting or breaching party shall pay all 
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costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys fees, 
which may accrue from enforcing this Contract and Agreement, 
or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder, or by 
applicable law. 
17. SITUS, This Contract and Agreement shall be 
governed by and construed in accordance with laws of the 
State of Utah. Time is of the essence of this Agreement. 
18. INDEPENDENT SIGNIFICANCE. The provisions of 
this Contract and Agreement shall be deemed and construed to 
be independent and severable, and the invalidity or 
unenforceability of any one provision or portion thereof 
shall not affect the validity or enforceability of any other 
provision thereof. 
19. ASSIGNMENT. Neither party to this Agreement 
shall be entitled to assign this Agreement in whole or in 
part without first obtaining the written consent of the 
non-assigning party. Any attempted assignment without 
consent shall be null and void. 
20. TIME. Time is of the essence of this 
Agreement. 
21. INSURANCE. Each party shall be responsible 
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for providing at its own expense, public liability and 
property damage insurance covering its operation at the 
Center. 
SALT LAKE SPORTS MEDICINE 
CENTER, a Utah Partnership 
By THOMAS D. ROSENBERG, M.D., 
a Professional Corporation 
By LONNIE Jy PAUIOS/M.D., Inc., 
a Profe/s^fonM Corporation 
RUSSELL A. TORONTO, M.D.' 




STATE OF UTAH ) 
(S3 • 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
On this (fa day of f)t/d/2£>l 19*5*7, 
personally appeared before me LONNIE E. PAULOS, as president 
of Lonnie E. Paulos, M,D-, Ire. a professional corporation, 
THOMAS D. ROSENBERG, as president of Thomas D. Rosenberg, 
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Inc, a professional corporation, and RUSSELL A. TORONTO, 
M.D., General Partners of SALT LAKE SPORTS MEDICINE CENTER, 
a Utah partnership, who acknowledged to me that said 
Professional Services Contract and Agreement was signed in 
behalf of said partnership. 
My Commission Expires: 
JU ?.&pJ 1990 
7 NOTARY P,#BJJC 
Residing at: ^WA 6, U&LK 
STATE OF UTAH 
(ss< 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
On this £ 3 ^ day of <z>*ir)l*^\^ 19 F7 , 
personally appeared before me H ^ t o r s CT^ (^IMPJLA^^ t 
who being by rr.e duly sworn, did say that he is the president 
of Salt Lake Knee and Sports Rehabilitation, Inc., a 
professional corporation and acknowledged that the above 
Professional Services Contract and Agreement was signed in 
behalf of said corporation with authority first had and 
obtained. 




an. " '• " On. 3C,1577
 y
 -* 
' NOTAR* BOBLIC 
Residing a t \ s 4 * c f & 6 ~ & C U6& 
«* f r, S«v 
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OP APPLICATION 
TO INDIVIDUAL THERAPISTS 
IN CONSIDERATION of tue benefit to be derived by 
each of us personally from the execution of the above 
Professional Services Contract and Lease Agreement, and 
because said Contract and Agreement would not be executed by 
Physicians without this personal Acknowledgment by each of 
us, we the undersigned GREGORY J. GARDNER and DOUGLAS B. 
TOOLE, hereby agree to each be bound personally and as 
representatives of Salt Lake Knee and Sports Rehabilitation, 
Inc. by the provisions of the above Contract and Agreement, 
including specifically, but not limited to, the provisions 
of Paragraph 13 relating to non-competition. 
DATED this 2*2** day cf ^^pU^l«,^ 1987. 
GREGORY ^ .C GARDNER 
/XJS>(Ju*~x^ 
r\ 
DOUGLAS B. TOOLE 
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF APPLICATION 
TO INDIVIDUAL PHYSICIANS 
IN CONSIDERATION of the benefit to be derived by 
each of us personally from the execution of the above 
Professional Services Contract and Lease Agreement, and 
because said Contract and Agreement would not be executed by 
Therapists without this personal Acknowledgment by each of 
us, we the undersigned THOMAS D. ROSENBERG, H.D. and LCNNIE 
E. PAULOS, M.D., hereby agree to each be bound personally 
and as representatives of our respective professional 
corporations by the provisions of whe above Contract and 
Agreement, including specifically, but not limited to, the 
provisions of Paragraph 13 relating to non-competition. 
DATED this l/^ day of fJVwh/yl . , 1987. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Attachment D 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.




Agreement dated th i s ^/^day of 
1989, between Sal t Lake Knee and Sports Rehab i l i t a t i on , Inc. 
(hereinafter referred to as "Rehabilitation'1) , and Sa l t Lake 
City Knee & Sports Medicine (hereinafter referred to as 
"Physicians"). 
WHEREAS Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center 
(hereinafter referred to as "Medicine") and Rehabi l i ta t ion 
entered into a Professional Services Contract and Lease 
Agreement dated September 23, 1987 (hereinafter referred to 
as the HAgreement"); and 
WHEREAS Medicine gave to Rehabi l i ta t ion a Notice 
of Termination dated January 19, 198 9 pursuant to the terms 
of the Agreement; and 
WHEREAS Physicians i s the successor in i n t e r e s t to 
Medicine; and 
WHEREAS Rehabilitation desires to s e l l to 
Physicians and Physicians desire to purchase from 
Rehabi l i ta t ion certain equipment owned by Rehabi l i ta t ion and 
currently located at the off ice of Rehabi l i tat ion a t 670 
East 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
Now, therefore, in consideration of the mutual 
covenants se t forth below, the part ies hereto agree as 
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1. Termination. The Agreement is hereby 
terminated effective April 19, 1989, subject to the 
provisions of paragraph 13 of that Agreement, which by its 
terms survives the termination of the Agreement, 
2. Vacation of Premises. Rehabilitation shall 
vacate the premises at 670 East 3 900 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, (hereinafter referred to as the "Leased Premises") 
which is the subject of the Agreement, no later than Sunday, 
April 23, 1989 at 12:00 Midnight. 
3. Release of Claims. The parties hereto hereby 
release each other and their predecessors' in interest and 
principals for all claims and liability to each other 
arising out of the Agreement or the parties1 performance 
thereunder, except for any claims arising out of paragraph 
11 and paragraph 13 of the Agreement, which claims are 
specifically reserved by the parties. 
4* Sale of Equipment. Rehabilitation hereby 
sells to Physicians and Physicians hereby purchase from 
Rehabilitation that equipment owned by Rehabilitation and 
currently located at the "Leased Premises" which is set 
forth in Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein 
by reference (hereinafter referred to as the "Equipment"). 
5. Purchase Price. The purchase price for the 
Equipment shall be Thirty-Three Thousand Nine Hundred and 
Twenty-Nine Dollars ($33,929.00) and shall be paid to 
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Rehabilitation by Physicians in cash at the time of Closing, 
subject to the provisions of paragraph 7 below. 
6. Payment of Costs in Connection with Granite 
School District High School Sports Medicine Program. In 
addition to the purchase price for the Equipment, Physicians 
shall pay to Rehabilitation at Closing, subject to the 
provisions of paragraph 7 below, the sum of Six Thousand 
Dollars ($6,000.00), which represents reimbursement to 
Rehabilitation for costs incurred by Rehabilitation in 
connection with Rehabilitation's participation in Medicine's 
Granite School District High School Sports Medicine Program. 
7._ Liens and Encumbrances, It is understood by 
the parties that the Equipment is encumbered by a security 
interest held by West One Bank (as successor in interest of 
Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company) to secure payment of a 
current balance owing of Forty-One Thousand Three Hundred 
Eighty-One and 37/100 dollars ($41,381.37). In addition, it 
is understood that the Equipment, as well as certain 
equipment previously sold by Rehabilitation to Physicians 
(in approximately September of 1987) is encumbered by a 
security interest held by Capital City Bank (as successor in 
interest of Union Bank)* Rehabilitation shall insure that 
those encumbrances are cleared and released in connection 
with the purchase hereunder. In that regard, it is 
understood that at Closing the payments to be made to 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-4-
Rehabilitation shall be paid jointly to Rehabilitation and 
West One Bank. Rehabilitation shall then use those funds 
together with such of its own funds as necessary to 
immediately pay off the amount owing to West One Bank and 
procure and have filed a termination of West Onefs security 
interest against the Equipment. It is anticipated that the 
parties will together proceed directly from the Leased 
Premises to the West One Bank on the day of Closing to make 
certain that the above-described procedure is accomplished. 
8. Closing, Closing shall occur at the Leased 
Premises at a time mutually agreeable to the partiesf but in 
no event later than Friday, May 5, 1989 at 5:00 p.m. At 
closing, Physicians or their representative shall take a 
physical inventory of the Equipment. At closing, 
Rehabilitation shall provide to Physicians written 
verification from Capital City Bank (as successor in 
interest to Union Bank) that any liens or security interests 
that entity may have against the Equipment and against any. 
equipment Physicians or its partners may have previously 
purchased from Rehabilitation (including without limitation 
the physical therapy equipment located at 3 59 8th Avenue 
which was purchased in approximately September of 198 7) have 
been terminated. Upon verification of the presence of each 
item of Equipment, and upon receipt of the verification 
required above, Physicians shall deliver to Rehabilitation a 
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check made payable to Rehabilitation and West One Bank for 
the entire purchase price of the Equipment together with the 
payment referred to in paragraph 6 above. 
9. Warranties. Rehabilitation warrants that it 
owns the Equipment, free from any liens or encumbrances 
except those referred to in paragraph 7 above, and has the 
right to sell the same. Rehabilitation further warrants 
that all of the Equipment shall at the time of Closing be in 
good working condition and free from defects. 
10. Coin Toss Regarding Murray High School. 
Physicians and Rehabilitation acknowledges that pursuant to 
paragraph 13 of the Agreement, the right to be involved in a 
Sports Medicine program at high schools which became a part 
of Medicine's High School Sports Medicine Program after the 
effective date of the Agreement would be determined by a 
toss of the coin. The parties agree that Murray High School 
fits into that category, and the parties therefore agree 
that at Closing a coin toss shall be conducted between 
Physicians and Rehabilitation, with the winner of that coin 
toss having the sole right to conduct a Sports Medicine 
Program at Murray High School, free from competition from 
the loser of that coin toss. 
11. Purchase of Center. It is agreed that if 
within two (2) years from the date of this Agreement, 
Physicians sells the Center to any third party, 
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Rehabi l i ta t ion shal l be e n t i t l e d to one-third (1/3) of that 
portion of the purchase price which is attributed to good 
w i l l . "Sale" s h a l l be defined as a transfer wherein the 
purchaser acquires and pays consideration for a l l of the 
fo l lowing: The Center !s l ease on the Leased Premises, 
ownership of the name "Sale Lake Sports Medicine Center , n 
a l l of the equipment and other assets located at the Center, 
the Center's pat ients and accounts rece ivable , and whereby 
the purchaser assumes complete operational control of the 
business of the Center and continues operating under t h e 
same name at the same locat ion . 
12. Binding Agreement. This Agreement s h a l l be 
binding on and inure to the benefit of the p a r t i e s , and 
t h e i r h e i r s , successors , and ass igns . 
13. Time. Time i s of the essence of t h i s 
Agreement. 
**• Attorneys Fees . Should any party d e f a u l t in 
or breach any of the covenants or agreements contained 
here in , the default ing or breaching party sha l l pay a l l 
c o s t s and expenses, including reasonable attorneys f e e s , 
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which may accrue from enforc ing t h i s Agreement, or in 
pursuing any remedy provided hereunder, or by a p p l i c a b l e 
l aw. 
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS 
REHABILITATION, INC. 
BY * h^ijju^ 
I t s 
 8. \Ji>^C~ 
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS 
MEDICINE, a Utah P a r t n e r s h i p 
By LONNIE E. PAULOS^ M.D. , Inc . 
a Profess ional^C^TPbra^ion, 
General Pai 
..By TBJOMAS.D. BOSENBERG, M.D., p.C. 
a Professional Corporation, 
'General Partner 
By ' /j^C^ /j£*~ 
Thdinas D. Rosenberg V 
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PKYSICAT. THERAPY EQUIPMENT • 
3900 SOUTH CLIHIC 
EQUIPMENT AT 70* 
LEG CURL 
SMITH MACHINE (SQUAT) 






SCOTSMAN ZCZ MACHINE 
PITRON CYCLE 
MEDMSTRIC XT-1000 
EXAM TABLES (6 f $350 ZA.) 
CHATTANOGA XNTELECT STIM 





EQUIPMENT t 3 0 * 
• LEG EXTENSION 
SEATED CHEST PRESS 
PULLOVER 
AB CRUNCH 




OPTICS EQUIPMENT 9 7 0 * 
ISOTSC PHONES (4 g 270J 
ISM WHSSLHRITER 
AMANO TIMS CLOCK 
TYPEWRITER 3TAN3 
FILE CABINETS {2 * 480 J 
POOT STOOL 
WAITING ROOM SOFA (1/2) 
LUNCHROOM TABLE 
LUNCHROOM CHAIRS - 4 
MICROWAVE 
CHAIRS (3 S 134) 
DESK 
TOTAL: 
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ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT, made as 
of May 24, 1990, by and between SALT 
LAKE CITY KNEE AND SPORTS 
MEDICINE, a Utah general partnership 
("Seller"); and IHC HOSPITALS, INC., a 
Utah non-profit corporation ("Buyer"). 
R E C I T A L S : 
A. Seller is engaged, and has owned assets utilized, in the business of 
operating certain physical therapy and rehabilitation facilities that are presently 
located at 670 East 3900 South, and 359 8th Avenue, in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
(collectively, the "Rehab Facilities"), and a part time medical clinic located at the 
Park City Resort Center in Park City, Utah (the "Park City Facilities"). 
B. Seller desires to sell, transfer, and assign, and Buyer desires to 
purchase, a undivided one-half interest in certain of the assets used in the Rehab 
Facilities and the Park City Facilities, in connection with and as contemplated by 
that certain Joint Venture Agreement of Sports Medicine West of even date 
herewith between Seller and Buyer (the "Joint Venture Agreement"), upon the 
terms and conditions set forth herein. 
A G R E E M E N T : 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and for other good and 
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby 
acknowledged, the parties hereto hereby agree as follows: 
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1. Purchase and Sale. Seller hereby sells, transfers, and assigns to Buyer, 
and Buyer hereby purchases from Seller, an undivided one-half interest in the 
following described property (collectively, the "Assets"): 
(a) Personal Property and Accounts, Seller's right, title and interest 
in and to all furniture, fixtures, equipment, appliances, inventory, uniforms, 
promotional materials, printed matters, supplies, books, records, prepaid expenses, 
prepaid taxes, prepaid contractual payments and deposits, cash on hand, bank 
deposits, accounts receivable and proceeds and products thereof, records 
pertaining to accounts receivable, causes of action, licenses, miscellaneous 
personal property, goodwill and general intangibles, with respect to the Rehab 
Facilities and the Park City Facilities, including, without limitation, the property 
and items described on Exhibit ,1fA" attached hereto (collectively, the "Personal 
Property and Accounts"). 
(b) Leasehold Interests. Seller's right, title and interest (i) as a lessee 
or tenant under that certain Lease Agreement pertaining to the Park City 
Facilities, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" (the 
"Park City Lease"), and (ii) in and to the space leases pertaining to the Rehab 
Facilities (true and correct copies of the leases which include the Rehab Facilities 
are attached hereto as Exhibit "C"), which shall be evidenced by subleases as 
described in paragraph 5(i) hereof (collectively, the "Rehab Leases"). 
(c) Material Contracts. Seller's rights and obligations under those 
certain contracts with respect to the Rehab Facilities and Park City Facilities, as 
described on Exhibit "D" attached hereto (collectively, the "Material Contracts"). 
-2-
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2. Purchase Price. The purchase price for the purchase by Buyer 
from Seller of an undivided one-half interest in the Assets shall be Six Hundred 
Sixty Two Thousand Two Hundred Twenty Five Dollars ($662,225), which shall be 
paid by Buyer to Seller by bank certified or cashiers check or wire transfer upon 
the execution of this Agreement by Seller and Buyer, and upon the execution by 
the appropriate party of all other documents and instruments contemplated hereby 
(this Agreement and said documents and instruments are hereinafter sometimes 
referred to collectively as the "Purchase and Sale Documents11). 
3. Representations and Warranties of, Seller. Seller represents and 
warrants to Buyer the following matters as of the date hereof, with the 
understanding that Buyer is relying upon said representations and warranties in 
entering into the Purchase and Sale Documents: 
(a) Organization of Seller. Seller is a general partnership duly 
organized, validly existing and in good standing under and by virtue of the laws of 
the State of Utah, and carries on the businesses of, among other things, operating 
the Rehab Facilities and the Park City Facilities. Seller has the power and 
necessary licenses to own all of its properties and assets and to carry on its 
businesses as presently conducted, and is duly authorized to sell to Buyer an 
undivided one-half interest in the Assets pursuant to the Purchase and Sale 
Documents. The partners of Seller have taken all action required by Seller's 
partnership agreement or otherwise to authorize the execution and delivery of the 
Purchase and Sale Documents. The Purchase and Sale Documents are valid and 
binding upon Seller in accordance with their terms. 
-3-
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(b) Litigation. There are no suits, governmental proceedings, or 
litigation pending, or to the knowledge of Seller, threatened which might 
materially affect the financial condition, business or property of the Rehab 
Facilities or Park City Facilities. 
(c) Personal Property and Accounts. The list of Personal Property 
and Accounts attached hereto as Exhibit "A" includes all inventory and equipment 
with respect to the Rehab Facilities and Park City Facilities. Said inventory is 
usable in the ordinary course of business and said equipment is in good condition 
and repair, reasonable wear and tear excepted. All accounts receivable shown on 
the list of Personal Property and Accounts attached hereto as Exhibit !fA,f arose in 
the ordinary course of business, and subject to reasonable allowances for bad 
debts, are collectible in the ordinary course of business. 
(d) Employment Contracts. Except as set forth on Exhibit "Eft 
attached hereto, there are no written contracts of employment between Seller and 
any employee pertaining to the Rehab Facilities or Park City Facilities. 
(e) Title. Seller owns the Assets free and clear of all liens, 
encumbrances, interests, demands and claims of any kind, except for any 
equipment leases, conditional sale contracts, or security interests which are 
included in the Material Contracts, and subject to the terms of the Park City 
Lease and Rehab Leases. 
(f) Material Contracts* True and correct copies of the Material 
Contracts have previously been delivered to Buyer, and are in full force and effect 
and are freely assignable without consent. All amounts due thereunder, through 
-4-
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the date hereof, have been paid in full and Seller is not otherwise in default 
thereunder. 
(g) Compliance With Law. Seller has complied with and is not in 
violation of any federal, state or local statute, law or regulation, including, 
without limitation, any applicable building, zoning or other law, ordinance or 
regulation affecting the operation of the Rehab Facilities or the Park City 
Facilities, and holds or has obtained all governmental permits, licenses, consents, 
approvals and waivers necessary for the lawful operation of the Rehab Facilities 
and the Park City Facilities as now conducted. 
(h) No Material Adverse Change. There has been no material adverse 
change in the financial condition of the operatioRs^ot the Rehab Facilities and 
Park City Facilities from the M&joh 31, 1#9Q balance sheets and operating 
statements with respect thereto and which have previously been delivered to 
Buyer. As of the date hereof, the positive net worth of the Rehab Facilities and 
Park City Facilities shall not be less than $167,756. To the best of Seller's 
knowledge, all financial statements provided by Seller to Buyer are true, correct 
and complete and fairly present the financial position of the Rehab Facilities and 
Park City Facilities. 
(i) Environmental Laws. Seller is not generating on the site of the 
Rehab Facilities or Park City Facilities, and is not disposing of, any hazardous 
substances or toxic wastes in violation of any applicable state or federal law 
pertaining to such wastes. 
-5-
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(]) Liabilities. Attached hereto as Exhibit "Fff is a list of the 
liabilities pertaining to the Rehab Facilities and Park City Facilities as of April 
30, 1990, all of which arose in the ordinary course of business. 
(k) Accuracy of Representations and Warranties. No representation 
or warranty by Seller in the Purchase and Sale Documents, nor any statement, 
certificate, list, document or schedule furnished or to be furnished by Seller 
pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Documents or in connection with the 
transactions contemplated hereby, contains or shall contain any untrue statement 
of a material fact or omits or shall omit a material fact necessary to make the 
statements contained therein, in light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading. 
4. Representations and Warranties of Buyer. Buyer represents and 
warrants to Seller the following matter's as of the date hereof, with the 
understanding that Seller is relying upon said representations and warranties and 
entering into the Purchase and Sale Documents: 
(a) Organization of Buyer. Buyer is a non-profit corporation duly 
organized, validly existing and in good standing under the laws of the State of 
Utah, has corporate power to own all of its properties and assets and to carry on 
its businesses as presently conducted, and has corporate power and is duly 
authorized to enter into the Purchase and Sale Documents. The Board of 
Directors of Buyer has taken all action required by law, its articles of 
incorporation, bylaws or otherwise to authorize the execution and delivery of the 
Purchase and Sale Documents, and the Purchase and Sale Documents are valid and 
binding upon Buyer in accordance with their terms. 
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(b) Accuracy of Representations and Warranties* No representation 
or warranty by Buyer in the Purchase and Sale Documents, nor in any statement, 
certificate or schedule furnished or to be furnished by Buyer pursuant to the 
Purchase and Sale Documents, or in connection with the transactions 
contemplated hereby, contains or shall contain any untrue statement of a material 
fact or omits or shall omit a material fact necessary to make the statements 
contained therein, in light of the circumstances under which it was made, not 
misleading. 
5. Closing Transactions* Simultaneously with the execution of this 
Agreement, the parties hereto shall execute and deliver to the other, as 
appropriate, the following: 
(i) Seller and Sports Medicine West shall enter into an 
Assignment and Assumption Agreement with respect to the Park City 
Lease and the Sublease for the Rehab Leases the forms of Exhibit ,fG" 
and f,H,f attached hereto, respectively. 
(ii) Seller shall execute and deliver to Buyer a Special 
Warranty Bill of Sale and Assignment with respect to the Personal 
Property and Accounts, in the form of Exhibit "I" attached hereto. 
(iii) Seller and Buyer shall enter into the Assignment and 
Assumption of Material Contracts in the form of Exhibit "J" attached 
hereto. 
(iv) Seller and Buyer shall enter into a Blanket Assignment and 
Assumption in the form of Exhibit ffKtf attached hereto. 
-7 -
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(v) Seller and Buyer shall have entered into the Joint Venture 
Agreement and Seller and Buyer shall contribute their respective 
undivided one-half interest in the Assets to Sports Medicine West as 
provided in the Joint Venture Agreement, and shall execute such 
documents as are necessary to evidence said contribution. 
(vi) Seller and Buyer shall deliver to each other evidence 
reasonably acceptable to the other party authorizing the consummation 
by the other party of the transactions contemplated hereby, and the 
execution and delivery of the Purchase and Sale Documents. 
6. "As Is" Purchase. Except for the representations and warranties of 
Seller set forth herein, Buyer accepts and purchases, on a "where is, as is" basis, 
an undivided one-half interest in the Assets. 
7. Indemnification. Seller shall indemnify Buyer and Sports Medicine West 
and hold Buyer and Sports Medicine West harmless from and against all losses, 
claims, damages or liabilities (including reasonable costs, expenses and attorneys1 
fees) arising out of any breach of warranty or inaccurate or erroneous 
representation of Seller contained herein, or arising from any liability of the 
Rehab Facilities or Park City Facilities not assigned to and assumed by Buyer 
hereunder, and which arose or was incurred prior to the date hereof. Buyer shall 
indemnify Seller and Sports Medicine West and hold Seller and Sports Medicine 
West harmless from and against all losses, claims, damages or liabilities (including 
reasonable costs, expenses and attorneys1 fees) arising out of any breach of 
warranty or inaccurate or erroneous representation of Buyer contained herein. 
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8. Default. In the event of a default by any party hereto of their 
respective obligations hereunder, the party not in default shall have all rights and 
remedies available at law or in equity against the party in default, including, 
without limitation, suing for specific performance and/or damages hereunder. 
9. Miscellaneous. 
(a) Commissions. Buyer represents and warrants to Seller that it has 
not, and Seller represents and warrants to Buyer that it has not, employed any 
broker, finder or consultant in connection with the transactions contemplated by 
the Purchase and Sale Documents. Seller and Buyer represent and warrant to each 
other that all negotiations relative to this Agreement have been carried on 
directly between them without the intervention of any party. Except as otherwise 
agreed to between the parties, Seller and Buyer will be responsible for the 
payment of the charges of their respective counsel and for any other expenses in 
connection with the Purchase and Sale Documents. 
(b) Notices. Any notices or other communications required or 
permitted hereunder shall be sufficiently given if hand-delivered or sent by 
certified mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, or by telecopier, 
addressed as follows: 
To Seller: Salt Lake City Knee and Sports Medicine 
359 East 8th Avenue, Suite 206 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Attention: Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D. 
Thomas D. Rosenberg, M.D. 
Gene Oakes 
-9-
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Copy To: Cary D. Jones, Esq. 
HANSEN JONES <5c LETA 
50 West Broadway 
Suite 600 - Valley Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
To Buyer: IHC Hospitals, Inc. 
Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street, Suite 2100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attention: Everett N. Goodwin, Jr. 
Copy To: Thomas A. Ellison, Esq. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY CORNWALL <5c McCARTHY 
50 South Main #1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
or to such other address as shall be furnished in writing by any party, and any such 
notice or communication shall be deemed to have been given as of the date so 
delivered or mailed. 
(c) Successors and Assigns. The Purchase and Sale Documents shall 
be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective 
heirs, successors and assigns. 
(d) Governing Law; Counterparts. The Purchase and Sale Documents 
shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of 
Utah, and may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which shall be 
deemed an original, but all of which together shall constitute one and the same 
instrument. 
(e) Entire Agreement. The Purchase and Sale Documents contain the 
entire agreement between the parties with respect to the transactions 
contemplated hereby and supersede all previous written or oral negotiations, 
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commitments and writings and cannot be altered or otherwise amended except 
pursuant to an instrument in writing signed by each of the parties hereto. 
(f) Headings. The headings in the sections of this Agreement are 
inserted for convenience only and shall not constitute a part hereof. 
(g) Further Assurances. Each party shall, promptly upon the request 
of the other, execute, acknowledge and deliver to the other, any and all further 
instruments and assurances reasonably requested or appropriate to evidence or 
give effect to the provisions of the Purchase and Sale Documents. 
(h) Litigation. In the event of any litigation by any party hereto to 
enforce the terms of the Purchase and Sale Documents, the prevailing party in 
such litigation shall be entitled to receive from the other party payment of 
attorneys' fees incurred (whether before or after commencement of such 
litigation) by the prevailing party. 
(i) Exhibits. All exhibits a t tached to this Agreement are hereby 
incorporated in this Agreement by this reference. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Agreement has been executed by each of the 
parties hereto as of the day and year first above written. 
SELLER: 
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE AND SPORTS MEDICINE 
a Utah general partnership 
By LONNIE E. PAULOS, M.D., INC. 
a Utah professional c^porat ion 
Its General Partner 
- 1 1 -
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AND 
By THOMAS D. ROSENBERG, M.D., 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
a Utah professional corporation 
Its General Partner 
By. 7) (yCcix^j* 
Thomas D. Rosenberg, President 
BUYER: 
IHC HOSPITALS, INC. 
a Utah non-profit corporation 
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EXHIBIT LIST 
Exhibit "A" List of Personal Property 
Exhibit "B" Park City Lease 
Exhibit "C" Rehab Lease 
Exhibit ffD,f List of Material Contracts 
Exhibit TfEtf List of Employment Contracts 
Exhibit "F" List of Liabilities 
Exhibit lfGff Assignment and Assumption of 
Park City Lease 
Exhibit "H" Rehab Sublease 
Exhibit "I" Special Warranty Bill of Sale and Assignment 
Exhibit ,fJtf Assignment and Assumption of Material Contracts 
Exhibit ,fK!f Blanket Assignment and Assumption 
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SL KNEE & SPORTS MEDICINE 
Assets Listing 
May 15, 1990 
REHAB: - 8th Avenue: 
Reception: 
2 12-Button Phones 
2 Wyse Terminals 
1 Fujitsu DL-2400 Printer 
1 4-Drawer Lateral File 
1 IBM Selectric III Typewriter 
2 Rolling Office Arm Chairs 
1 Adding Machine 
4 Mauve and Oak Waiting Room Chairs 
1 Gray Cube End Table 
1 Oak-Covered, Double-Pedestal Office Desk 
1 Bostitch Pencil Sharpener 
2 Plastic Chair Mats 
2 Chart Cabinets 
1 Dictaphone 
Treatment Area: 
1 Tredex Universal Treadmill 
2 Exercise Bikes (Fitron Cybex) 
2 Jumper Trampoline 
1 Nautilus Super Pullover 
1 Scotsman Ice Machine 
1 Whitehall Hydrotherapy Equipment 
1 Nordic Track 
1 Universal Computerow 
1 Westinghouse Freezer 
6 Exam Tables 
1 Cybex UBE Ergometer 
2 Medtronic EGS and Stim 
1 Ultra Sound Intellect 23OP 
1 Lifecycle 
1 Stairmaster 
1 Pro Fitter 
1 Wall Weight (NK Company) 
1 Cybex Bike 
1 Plyometric Board 
1 Merac Computerized Testing Station 
1 Video Player 
1 Auto Range 
Barbell Weights 
1 Stainless Steel Cart 
EXHIBIT A 
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Cast Room: 
1 Hydrocollatar 
2 Exam Tables 
1 Stryker Cast Cutter 
2 Gray Wall Partitions 
1 Cast Cabinet 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SL KNEE & SPORTS MEDICINE 
Assets Listing 
May 1, 1990 
REHAB: - 8th Avenue: 
Rehab Office: 
2 Double-Pedestal Oak Desks 
2 Rolling Oak Burgundy Arm Chairs 
1 4-Drawer Vertical Gray Cabinet 
1 20-Button Phone 
1 Realistic Stereo Tuner 
1 McGohan 10-watt Amplifier Model MS-103 
1 Sharp Stereo Cassette Deck RT-100 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SL KNEE & SPORTS MEDICINE 
Assets Listing 
May 1, 1990 
REHAB: - 39th South 
Office Area: 
4 Isotec Phones^ / 
1 IBM Wheelwriter^ 
1 Typewriter Stand^ 
2 Fi le Cabinets ^ 
1 Foot Stool^ y 
1/2 Waiting Room Sofa^ 
1 Lunchroom Tabled / 
3 Lunchroom Chairs^ 
1 Microwave/ y 
3 Waiting Room Chairs ^ 
1 Desk/ 
1 Office Chair 
1 Computer Terminal & Modem & Printer 
1 Adding Machine 
1 Clock / 
Treatment Area: 
1 Leg Curl' 
1 Computerowv 
1 Leg Press v ' , ^/Uu^ 
1 Total Hip^ '
 ysAjji 
1 Mettler Ultrasound^ 
1 Multiflex Stimulator^; 
1 Scotsman Ice Machine^ 
2 Fitron Cycle^ 
1 Medmetric KT-1000 v 
7 Exam Tablesw ^ 
1 Chattanoga Intelect Stim 
1 Hydrocollator Hot Pack^ 
1 Whirlpool and Whirlpool Stand^ 
1 Mixing Valve * 
1 Cast Cutter^ 
1 Leg Extension-
1 Pullover \/ 
1 Kin Com y' 
1 Sani Grinder^ 
1 SandduneiX 
1 UBE 
1 Pilates Tables (Performer & Trapez) 
1 Stair Master 
1 Pro-Fitter 
1 Baps Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
REHAB: - 39th South 
1 Nordic Track 
1 Pedex 
1 Pogo Ball 




1 Orthofeet System 
1 Bio-Support Alignment System 
1 Toaster Oven 
10-20Pillows 
Softgoods & Cast Supplies 
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SL KNEE & SPORTS MEDICINE 
Assets Listing 
May 1, 1990 
PARK CITY: 
Reception: 
1 Desk with Attached Counter 
1 File Cabinet 
2 Office Chairs 
Front Holding Area: 
1 Wheeled Gurney 
2 Wheelchairs 
Exam Rooms: 
3 Exam Tables 
1 Wall Mounted Otoscope 
3 Shelf Wall Units 
4 Wooden Chairs 
3 Stools 
2 Office Chairs 
Casting Area: 
1 Stryker Gurney 
1 Cabinet with Shelves 
1 Wall-Mounted Light Box 
X-Ray Room: 
1 X-ray Table with Buclcy 
1 Wall-Mounted Light Box 
1 Wall-Mounted BucJcy 
1 Toshiba Portable X-ray Machine 
1 Free-Standing Lead Shield 
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MR. MORRIS: Can I take a minute with him? 
MR. GREEN: Sure. 
MR. MORRIS: Let's go out for a second. 
MR. GREEN: We're not going to be very much 
longer. 
(There was an attorney-witness discussion.) 
Q. BY MR. GREEN: Now, Doctor, the operation as 
it existed in 1989 at the 39th South office --
MR. MORRIS: Before or after the 
determination agreement --never mind. 
Q. BY MR. GREEN: -- in essence, moved over 
here? 
MR. MORRIS: Object to the form. 
A. Yes. 
Q. BY MR. GREEN: And it moved as a result of 
the sale? 
A. Correct. 
Let me just amend that, not to deviate. It 
moved here not as a result of the sale, it moved here 
because of a desire to relocate. The sale was 
certainly not the event that led to a relocation, it 
was a peripheral small piece of the puzzle. 
Q. Would you say it facilitated the move? 
A. It facilitated it because Intermountain 
Health Care insisted virtually on buying one-half of 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC 
(801) 521-5222 
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23 
Rosenberg, M.D. (Examination by Mr. Green) 
1 MR. MORRIS: Can I take a minute with him? 
2 MR. GREEN: Sure. 
3 MR. MORRIS: Let's go out for a second. 
4 MR. GREEN: We're not going to be very much 
5 longer. 
6 (There was an attorney-witness discussion.) 
7 Q. BY MR. GREEN: Now, Doctor, the operation as 
8 it existed in 1989 at the 39th South office --
9 MR. MORRIS: Before or after the 
10 determination agreement -- never mind. 
11 Q. BY MR. GREEN: -- in essence, moved over 
12 here? 
13 MR. MORRIS: Object to the form. 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. BY MR. GREEN: And it moved as a result of 
16 the sale? 
17 A. Correct. 
18 Let me just amend that, not to deviate. It 
19 moved here not as a result of the sale, it moved here 
20 because of a desire to relocate. The sale was 
21 certainly not the event that led to a relocation, it 
22 was a peripheral small piece of the puzzle. 
23 Q. Would you say it facilitated the move? 
24 A. It facilitated it because Intermountain 
25 Health Care insisted virtually on buying one-half of 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC. 
(801) 521-5222 
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Rosenberg/ M.D. (Examination by Mr. lireen; 
1 physical therapy in order to develop an orthopedic 
2 specialty hospital. 
3 Q. And I believe you testified that at all times 
4 it was your intent to at least maintain a one-half 
5 interest in the center, the 3900, or I think you 
6 referred to it as the Rehabilitation Center? 
7 A, That one-half interest retained by 
8 physicians, one-half ownership assumed by 
9 Intermountain Health Care was an overriding principal 
10 of the agreement to the Orthopedic Specialty Hospital. 
11 Q. Was it your intent -- at the time you entered 
12 into the termination agreement which is Exhibit 4 to 
13 this deposition, was it your intent at that time to 
14 maintain one-half of the ownership? 
15 A. I don't think there was any particular intent 
16 one way or the other. 
17 Q. You reviewed Paragraph 11 a moment ago, the 
18 paragraph relating to the subsequent sale of the 
19 center. Can you give me an example of when that would 
20 ever come in to play or become operative. 
21 A. The --
22 MR. MORRIS: Let me interpose an objection. 
23 It calls for a legal conclusion. 
24 You can go ahead. 
25 A. This would come in to play based on the 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC. 
(801) 521-5222 
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25 
Rosenberg/ M.D. (Examination by Mr. Green) 
1 agreement. If the physicians sold Rehabilitation 
2 outright, which I'm. sure was a potential option at 
3 that time --
4 Q. BY MR. GREEN: I was under the impression 
5 that your testimony was that it was your desire to 
6 maintain a one-half interest at all times. 
7 A. No, that's incorrect. It was a requirement 
8 from Intermountain Health Care that they purchase one 
9 half or else they would not enter further into 
10 negotiations regarding a joint venture, Orthopedic 
11 Specialty Hospital, et cetera. It was a principle 
12 expressed early by one of their key negotiators Gary 
13 Franks (phonetic), and I recall very specifically when 
14 that stipulation was stated, and subsequent 
15 negotiations were then directed accordingly. 
16 Prior to that time there was no -- there was 
17 no physician-originated concepts of selling none, 
18 one-half, all, et cetera. 
19 Q. Do you understand your ownership in Sports 
20 Medicine West? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. And doesn't -- or isn't it true that Sports 
23 Medicine West owns all of the assets that were once at 
24 3900 South? 
25 MR. MORRIS: Lack of foundation and the 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC. 
(801) 521-5222 
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IiROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557) 
j! KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON (0099) 
|! CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
11One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
U201 South Main Street 
11Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
\\ (801) 537-5555 
UAttorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
: SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS 
;! REHABILITATION, INC., fka 
'PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
: VS. 
! SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS 
MEDICINE, a Utah general 
partnership, LONNIE E. PAULOS, 
M.D., P.C., a Utah 
professional corporation and 
: THOMAS D. ROSENBURG, M.D., 
P.C., a Utah professional 
corporation, general partners, 
Defendants. 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501(1) (c) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, Defendants Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine, 
Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C., and Thomas D. Rosenburg, M.D., P.C., 
(referred to herein as "Defendants" or "Defendant Doctors") 
respectfully submit this Reply Memorandum in Support of Their 
Motion for Summary Judgment against Salt Lake Knee and Sports 
Rehabilitation, Inc. ("Rehab"). 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910906316 CN 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
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ARGUMENT 
Rehab's Memorandum of Points and Authorities merely 
(reinforces that summary judgment is proper under the undisputed 
facts of this case and the controlling case authority, for two 
!reasons: 
i 1. Rehab raises no genuine factual issue disputing that 
I the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" was not sold. 
The record stands without dispute that the name was never 
I sold to IHC or any third party. Rehab even admits that none 
! of the agreements, schedules of assets, bills of sale, or 
j other documents reflecting or effecting the sale to IHC 
mentioned or included the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
J Center." 
j 2. Rehab does not and cannot dispute the uncontroverted 
I fact that the price paid by IHC to the Defendants to acquire 
j certain intangible assets was not for good will, but as 
| consideration for non-competition agreements executed by the 
i Defendant Doctors., 
|| There is a further basis for summary judgment in this case, 
jj Pursuant to Rule 4-501(2) (b) a party opposing summary judgment 
!|must specifically controvert the movant's statement of undisputed 
i i 
| j facts, stating the numbered sentence or sentences that are 
jl 
ildisputed. Rehab has failed to do that, because in good faith it 
l! 
j!cannot dispute those facts. Not a single numbered sentence of the 
|! 
jlmovant's facts are specifically referenced or disputed. Rehab's 
! i 
•statement of disputed facts is simply a rambling argument that 
11 does not address in any manner the vast majority of the numbered 
• j 
iI sentences in the Defendant Doctors statement of undisputed facts. 
|jConsequently, pursuant to Rule 4-501 Defendants' statement of 
i;undisputed facts is deemed admitted for purposes of summary 
; i , i judgment. 
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I POINT I 
jj THE NAME "SALT LAKE SPORTS MEDICINE CENTER" 
| WAS NEVER SOLD AND CONSEQUENTLY PARAGRAPH 11 OF 
|| , THE TERMINATION AGREEMENT HAS NO APPLICATION 
I The Defendant Doctors have no potential liability to Rehab, 
jjif the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center11 was not sold to 
IlIHC. Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement specifies: 
I! "Sale" shall be defined as a transfer wherein 
|j the purchaser acquires and pays consideration 
Si for all of the following:..-ownership of the 
II name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center,".... 
11Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement, (emphasis added). 
jj This is so well established that Rehab admitted the same in 
ijthe deposition of its principal, Gregory Gardner: 
11 
i i 
ji Q. And in order for this paragraph 11 [of the Termination 
!; Agreement] to be triggered, it is true, is it not that 
jj your understanding that the name Salt Lake Sports 
|! Medicine Center had to be sold to a third party and 
11 used by the third party after the sale? 
A. That is correct. 
j ! , , • • • • ' • 
jiG. Gardner Deposition at 41, (emphasis added). 
| i 
lj Dr. Lonnie Paulos, who negotiated the sale with IHC has 
j; 
jitestified unequivocally that the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
jiCenter" was never sold to IHC or any third party. Rehab's 
I i 
j,Memorandum of Points and Authorities is unable to dispute that 
i ; 
I;testimony or advance any evidence to the contrary. Instead, it 
jj 
I! is forced to admit that the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
;Center" is not even mentioned or identified in any contract, list 
i j 
• J ' ' • • • 
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I of assets, bill of sale or other document identifying the assets 
i!acquired by or transferred to IHC. Rehab concedes: 
I The Plaintiff admits that the name "Salt Lake 
(I Sports Medicine Center" does not appear as an 
j| asset generated pursuant to the transaction 
| resulting in the ownership of the Center by 
11 the joint venture [IHC and Sports Medicine 
; | West]. 
11 Rehabilitation's Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 3. 
!| That admission is compelling evidence for summary judgment 
j|in favor of the Defendant Doctors, for two reasons: 
j! First, the sale of certain assets of Salt Lake Sports 
|| Medicine Center by the Defendant Doctors to IHC was a very 
;!sophisticated transaction, drafted, orchestrated and supervised 
liby an army of lawyers on both sides of the transaction. Reams of 
illegal documents were generated documenting and identifying every 
; asset being sold. In addition, bills of sale were prepared 
; reflecting the transfer of title to such assets. In that context, 
M Rehab admits that none of these agreements, schedules, lists, or 
jj bills of sale identified or included in the sale of the name: 
|j 
I j"Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center". As a matter of law, because 
jj 
j the parties did not agree or contract to sell that name and did 
| not transfer title to it, it was not sold. 
'., Second, Rehab's admission does not stand alone. Rather than 
j; 
i disputing material facts, Rehabfs admission corroborates and 
r 
I verifies the testimony of Dr. Lonnie Paulos that the name Salt 
; Lake Sports Medicine Center was not sold to IHC to any other third 
Mparty. It reinforces the deposition testimony of the principals 
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!of Rehab that they have no evidence that the name "Salt Lake 
I 
!Sports Medicine Center" was sold to IHC. Gardner Deposition at 
i 
i . . 
141; Toole Deposition at 85. 
| Under these circumstances summary judgment is mandated by a 
!long line of controlling case authority:1 The Utah Supreme Court 
'has instructed: 
| Summary judgment is proper when the 
pleadings and other documents before 
I the Court establish that there is no 
basis for awarding the relief sought 
by a litigant... [W]hen the best 
showing a plaintiff could make would 
not entitle him to recover under the 
law, summary judgment is appropriate 
and serves its intended purpose of 
avoiding fruitless court proceedings 
with their attendant costs and time 
and money. 
Larson v. Wycoff Co. . 624 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Utah 1981) (emphasis 
added). That rule of law governs the undisputed facts of this 
case. Rehab has made no showing that the name "Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center" was sold. Therefore, it has no basis for the 
relief sought, and dismissal of the complaint on summary judgment 
is required as a matter of law. 
:S&G Inc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735 (Utah 
1996) (summary judgment affirmed on appeal; "'summary judgment is 
appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact exist and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law"); 
Reaaan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lunaen, 692 P.2d 776, 779 
(Utah 1984) (the major purpose of summary judgment is to allow 
the Court to pierce the pleadings to determine whether there is 
a genuine issue of fact); Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1172 (Utah 
1983); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 
(1986); Celotex Corp. V. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 
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I In a desperate effort to manufacture a factual issue Rehab 
j relies on a single sentence, out of context, from the affidavit 
I of Gene Oakes, concerning the removal of the name "Salt Lake 
I Sports Medicine"2 from the office space at 670 East 3900 South. 
ilBut that statement does not create any material issue of disputed 
j! 
hfact. It has nothing to do with the fact that the name "Salt Lake 
| Sports Medicine Center" was never sold to IHC or any third party. 
jit does not contradict the affidavit of Dr. Paulos. Neither does 
II it dispute the admissions by Rehab that the provisions of 
11 I 
11 paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement are not triggered unless 
j i 
11 the name was sold, or that none of the documents effecting the 
i'sale of assets to IHC mentioned, included or transferred the name 
i i 
i j |i"Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" to IHC. To the contrary, those 
j! facts stand undisputed, punctuated by Rehabfs admissions. 
jj. A question of when a name was removed from the 3900 South 
I jbuilding does not prevent summary judgment on the dispositive, 
II undisputed issue that the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" 
|!was never sold to IHC. The Utah Supreme Court has instructed that 
jja dispute on an irrelevant or immaterial factual issue does not 
i : 
! i 
ij bar summary judgment. 
;! We agree with Plaintiff's assertion 
:• that there are genuine issues of fact 
[\ . ... However, the mere existence of 
i. genuine issues of fact in the case as 
j: a whole does not preclude the entry of 
2It should be noted that the name which Rehab claims was 
^removed from the 3900 South building is not the name referred 
Ijto in paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement. That name is 
:;"Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center". 
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jl summary judgment if those issues are 
|! immaterial to the resolution of the 
11 case* * 
i 
|| Horgan v, Industrial Design Corp. . 657 P.2d 751 (Utah 
|1982)(emphasis added); Healar Ranch. Inc. v, Stillman, 619 P.2d 
111390 (Utah 1980) (summary judgment is not precluded simply because 
I! 
jja fact remains in dispute, but only when a material fact is 
I i | 
j!genuinely controverted). 
|j 
|j The attached Affidavit of Gene Oakes removes all doubt. He 
|junequivocally testifies that the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
|j Center" was not intended to be, and was not, sold to IHC. He 
|| further testifies that the cited paragraph from his prior 
I j 
|jaffidavit was not intended to address the issue of ownership of 
•j; the name. 
;; There are no material facts in dispute. The Defendant 
j|Doctors did not sell the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" 
:;to IHC or any third party. Rehab has not, and cannot, produce a 
I;shred of evidence to the contrary. Consequently, summary judgment 
|j is required as a matter of law. 
i i. 
li 
|| POINT II 
A PORTION OF THE PURCHASE PRICE PAID BY IHC 
WAS ATTRIBUTED TO GOOD WILL 
i! 
j! Dr. Lonnie Paulos, who negotiated and directed the sale of 
[^certain assets of Defendant Salt Lake Knee & Sports Medicine to 
ij IHC, has testified that IHC did not identify or value any good 
11will associated with it's purchase. Instead, IHC paid Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Cl rk Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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consideration to induce the Defendant Doctors to execute a non-
I competition agreement. 
Rehab has not and cannot provide any competent evidence to 
'the contrary. Its principals have testified they do not know 
I whether IHC paid consideration for the non-competition covenants 
II " • 
JI executed by the Defendant Doctors. 
I Further, no factual issues are raised by the testimony of 
JKirk Bennett, Rehabfs purported expert witness. He cannot raise 
i 
la factual issue concerning good will. He merely assumed for 
!purposes of his analysis that good will was the only intangible 
i 
11asset and that IHC paid for good will. Indeed, he admitted that 
|!he did not even consider in his analysis the non-competition 
i j 
j j agreements executed by the Defendant Doctors. Neither did he make 
i i 
l • . 
jiany investigation or analysis to determine what is generally paid 
i 
! by hospitals or HMOs buying medical practices to obtain non-
|jcompetition agreements. Bennett Deposition at 105-107. Mr. 
|;Bennett's testimony merely reveals his flawed, unprincipled, 
jhaphazard analysis, and demonstrates it does not satisfy even the 
inmost rudimentary evidentiary standards. 
J | Rehabfs argument also ignores the controlling legal principle 
j|that there can be no good will in a business that is dependent for 
Hits existence upon an individual who conducts the enterprise and 
|Iwould vanish if the individual left or entered into competition. 
j I This rule limiting the scope of good will was established in 
11Steven v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 956 (Utah App. 1988): 
!i 
•II 
I ! • • • • • • . ' 
i ; 
i ; • . 
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There can be no good will in a business 
I! that is dependent for its existence upon 
j! the individual who conducts the enter-
I j prise they would vanish were the 
individual to die, retire or quit work. 
That is precisely the setting presented by this case. If the 
jDefendant Doctors were to compete with IHC, the patients and 
I!practice IHC was attempting to acquire would disappear. That is 
|the reason for the non-competition agreements. Consequently, IHC 
ipaid consideration for the non-competition agreements, not for 
jI good will. 
II Rehab!s argument also fails because good will is inextricably 
11 tied to the business name. Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d at 952. 
|i ("The presence of good will may be evidenced by...[the] commercial 
hname"). If the name is not sold, no good will passes. As 
j;indicated in Point I hereof, the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
li ' ' . 
11 Center" was never sold to IHC or any third party. IHC did not 
•• i 
i j 
11want to purchase the name because it did not perceive it had any 
i 1 
i 
11value, and hence no good will. 
11 Rehab!s reliance on a boiler plate recital containing an 
11 
I;oblique abstract reference to good will is unavailing. There was 
jj 
lino good will identified or transferred in any of the 
|;transactional documents; IHC did not value any good will in its 
Evaluation analysis which determined the purchase price; and the 
|;Defendant Doctors received no payment for good will. Any premium 
! ! 
l i • 
! they received was for the non-competition agreements. Affidavit 
I of Dr. Paulos. Rehab has presented no evidence to the contrary. 
i i 
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Likewise, Rehab fs reference to the phrase in the non-
11 competition agreements: "to enhance the development of good will 
IJ within the joint venture"r is misleading and actually cuts against 
hits position. That phrase refers to developing good will in the 
li "joint venture" entity, which was formed after the sale of the 
|j assets to IHC. It does not refer to good will acquired by IHC by 
M 
11the purchase of assets. 
i 
|j IHC did not value good will. It did not pay for good will, 
| j 




II POINT III 
jj THE ISSUES RAISED BY THIS SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
jj MOTION ARE PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT FOR 
|j "" ADJUDICATION 
I 
j | 
j! Rehab makes a one sentence argument that the summary judgment 
11issues are not properly before the Court as a result of the ruling 
11 of the Court of Appeals. Only three lines — and no case 
1 1 
i 
11authority — is devoted to that argument because it is without 
j j 
11merit. 
jj The Court of Appeals did not consider or dispose of the 
I issues presented in this summary judgment motion. These issues 
11 were not raised in the prior summary judgment motion heard or 
jj 
I decided by this Court. Neither were they addressed in briefs or 
11in oral argument on appeal. 
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The Court of Appeals can only consider and resolve issues 
||first raised at the trial level. Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. 
IJ Co. , 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). This Court has not 
i 
'previously ruled on whether the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
I Center" was sold to IHC. Neither has it considered whether IHC 
|[paid a premium to obtain covenants of non-competition from the 
! j 
II Defendant Doctors, rather than for good will. These issues were 
Ijnot raised on appeal. The Court of Appeals did not consider, 
l! resolve or even discuss them. 
! i 
i 
j| I t is axiomatic that an appellate cour t ' s ruling i s limited 
j | to those issues specifically raised, considered and addressed in 
jj 
!|the trial court below and on appeal. The ruling does not extend 
li 
11to collateral matters not before the appellate court. DfAston v. 
h Df Aston, 844 p.2d 345, 351 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) confirms this 
j; controlling principle: 
Even when a judgment is ultimately reversed 
on appeal..., the reversal does not 
necessarily operate as an adjudication by 
I; the appellate court of any question other 
than those which were, in terms, discussed 
and decided by the appellate court, 
[citations omitted]. Thus, while a reversal 
effectively invalidates the prior judgment 
with respect to those issues addressed in 
the appeal, it * extends only to those issues 
which the appellate court decided in 
actuality or by necessary implication; it 
does not affect collateral matters not 
before the court.' Aye v. Fix, 192 Mont. 
j!' 141, 626 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Mont. 1981). 
| j "The law of the case doctrine applies to an issue or issues that 
11 have actually been decided. The doctrine does not apply to 
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r 
I statements made by the Court in passing, or stated as possible 
ijalternatives." 18 Moore's Federal Practice § 134.20[3] (3d ed. 
11 
IjMatthew Bender 1997). 
I i 
j The corollary of these the rules is that the district court 
li 
i j retains jurisdiction on remand to consider issues, that were not 
j j 
II considered or decided by the appellate courts. 18 Moore's Federal 
11Practice § 134.23[1][a] (3d ed. Matthew Bender 1997). 
ij 
•! Although the District Court owes obedience 
j| to the mandate of the Appellate Court, it 
j| retains jurisdiction under the mandate rule 
ij to reconsider issues on remand that were not 
| j expressly or implicitly decided by the 
Appellate Court. A District Court can, 
j| after remand, come to the same result as 
11 before remand by relying on grounds other 
ij than those specified in the Appellate 
Court's mandate. 
j Id. 
Consequently, the issues raised by this summary judgment 
I!motion are properly before this court for adjudication. They were 
;!never raised, considered or decided by the Court of Appeals. 




]! For the reasons set forth herein summary judgment in favor 
p of the Defendant Doctors is proper. There is no genuine dispute 
i i 
i:of material fact and summary judgment is proper as a matter of 
j: law. 
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DATED t h i s ^ f V d a y of January, 1998. 
gy i fV"^ 
ROBERT S. CAMPB-ELI^ 
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON 
of and for 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by 
the law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, One Utah Center, 
i 
i 
I Thirteenth Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
184111, and that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), 
.'Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing DEFENDANTS REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served upon: 
John C. Green, Esq. 
Kim M. Luhn, Esq. 
GREEN & LUHN, P.C. 
722 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
by hand delivery on this £~J day of January, 1998. 
/ ^ < 
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557) 
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON (0099) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS 
REHABILITATION, INC., fka 
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS 
MEDICINE, a Utah general 
partnership, LONNIE E. PAULOS, 
M.D., P.C., a Utah 
professional corporation and 
THOMAS D. ROSENBURG, M.D., 
P.C., a Utah professional 




IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910906316 CN 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
State of Utah •) 
ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Gene Oakes, being first duly sworn and otherwise competent to 
testify, hereby deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am a certified public accountant and at all times Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
r, r. 
|manager for the defendants. 
i 
11 2. I testify to all matters herein from personal knowledge. 
II 3.1 was intimately involved with Dr. Lonnie Paulos and Dr. 
I Thomas Rosenberg in negotiating the sale of certain assets of 
\\ Defendants1 to IHC. 
4. That sale was consummated by an Asset Purchase Agreement, 
and other agreements, documents and instruments dated on or about 
11May 24, 1990. 
11 5. In connection with the analysis and negotiations 
||concerning that sale, I advised and consulted with Dr. Paulos and 
;JDr. Rosenberg, and am familiar with the assets that were sold, and 
|| 
lithe assets that were not sold to IHC pursuant thereto. 
|| 
II- 6. In these negotiations IHC did not desire or request to 
i| 
H 
jipurchase the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center." Neither did 
i | 
lithe joint venture company, Sports Medicine West. Instead, they 
|;decided to use the name Sports Medicine West. 
i ' 
j| 7. Consequently, the Defendants did not sell or transfer the 
I! 
| | " S a l t Lake Spor t s Medicine Center" t o IHC or any t h i r d p a r t y . 
ij 
ji 8. That is why the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" 
h 
jjwas not mentioned or referred to in the Asset Purchase Agreement or 
j • 
| any of the documents related thereto, or bills of sale related 
W *.. . 
|! thereto. 
jj 9. On or about August 30, 1993, I signed a prior affidavit in 
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r- r 
After the Defendants and IHC Hospitals, Inc. 
entered into the IHC Agreement, those parties 
changed the name on the door of the Center, 
the marque in the lobby and two monument signs 
located on the building exterior at 3900 South 
and 700 East approximately one year before the 
Plaintiff's filed their lawsuit in October, 
1991. 
10. By that statement I simply intended to communicate that 
the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine" was removed from the building 
at 39th South and 7th East, as indicated. It was not my intent to 
indicate that IHC, Sports Medicine West, or any other party 
acquired an ownership interest in that name. As I have testified 
above, they did not. 
DATED this 22> day of January, 1998. 
GENE OAKES 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before\m: ay of January, 
1998, 
My Commission Expires; 
—- ^
 A A A A
 ~ 
m
-*j~ «**—*. -^-->» -c ••• 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the 
law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, One Utah Center, Thirteenth 
|!Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, and that 
J| in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Federal Rules of Civil 
|! Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
j i 
jGENE OAKES was served upon: 
jj John C. Green, Esq. 
'j Kim M. Luhn, Esq, 
II GREEN & LUHN, P.C. 
ji 722 Boston Building 
|l 9 Exchange Place 
!j Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
jiby Hand-Delivery on this day of January, 1998. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; DIV. 1 
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS 
REHABILITATION, INC., fka 
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS 
MEDICINE, a Utah general partnership, 
LONNIE E. PAULOS, M.D., P.C., a 
Utah professional corporation, and 
THOMAS D. ROSENBERG, M.D., P.C., a 
Utah professional corporation, 
general partners, 
Defendants. 
Reporter's Transcript of 
Hearing on Defendants' 
Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Case No. 910906316CN 
Hon. Homer F. Wilkinson 
COPY 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 27th day of January. 
1998, the above-entitled matter came on for hearing in Courtroom No. 502 
of the Courts Building, Metropolitan Hall of Justice, 240 East 400 South, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 before the Honrable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge in 
the Third Judicial District, State of Utah. 
APPEARANCES 
JOHN C. GREEN. Attorney-at-LawT Green & Luhn, P.C., 
722 Boston Building, 9 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone 531-7444 Fax 531-8885 appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff. 
MESSRS. ROBERT S. CAMPBELL. JR.. Attorney-at-Law; 
and KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON. Attorney-at-Law, Campbell, Maack & 
Sessions, One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt 
Lake City, UT 84111 Telephone 537-5555 Fax 537-5199 appearing on 
behalf of the Defendants. 
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I N D E X 
D E S C R I P T I O N P A G E / L I N E (Cont'd) 
January 27.1998 
MR. CAMPBELL 
Principal Argument 1/23 
MR. GREEN 
Responsive Argument 18/1 
MR. CAMPBELL 
Rebuttal Argument 30/13 
MR. GREEN 
Rejoinder Argument 35/16 
MR. CAMPBELL 
Rejoinder Argument 36/19 
COURT'S RULING 38/5 
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1 
2 (Whereupon, at the commencement 
3 of the instant proceedings, 
4 counsel from both sides sang, 
5 actually aloud, Happy Birthday to 
6 the Honorable Court -- an event 
7 particularly recordworthy given 
8 who counsel were making the 
9 attempt -- after which, the 
10 following proceedings were had in 
11 open court:) 
12 
13 THE COURT: Thank you, I think. 
14 (Laughter) The matter before the court is 
15 the case of Salt Lake Knee and Sports versus 
16 Salt Lake Knee and Sports medicine, 
17 This comes before the court on the 
18 defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
19 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, your Honor; it 
20 does. 
21 THE COURT: You may proceed when you're 
22 ready. 
23 MR. CAMPBELL: Thank you, your Honor. 
24 Robert Campbell and Kevin Anderson for the 
25 defendant Salt Lake Knee. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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2 MR. GREEN: John Green for the 
3 plaintiffs, your Honor, 
4 MR, CAMPBELL: May it please the court, 
5 this is a matter that's before the court on 
6 summary judgment on the strength that, as a 
7 matter of law, there are no genuine issues 
8 of material fact that not only require 
9 trial, but that would permit a trial to be 
10 held in this case, and that defendant Salt 
11 Lake Knee is entitled to judgment as a 
12 matter of law. 
13 As a matter of law, your Honor, 
14 because, your Honor, there's not an issue, 
15 foundational issue to been tried, that would have 
16 triggered the entitlement of the plaintiffs, Salt 
17 Lake Rehab -- and if it pleases your Honor, I'll 
18 refer to the plaintiff as Salt Lake Rehab, or 
19 sometimes as "Rehab,," and the defendant Salt Lake 
20 Knee sometimes as "Salt Lake Knee;" the whole 
21 name was Salt Lake Knee and Sports Medicine. 
22 But in any event, your Honor, the court 
23 is well aware of what the -- both the 
24 availability of Rule 56 is, and also the 
25 obligation of the court under Rule 56. 
Campbell: Principal Argument 
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1 And the issue, your Honor, is that 
2 there's a foundational question of fact that is 
3 missing from the plaintiff's proof, from Rehab•s 
4 proof, without which there can been no showing of 
5 entitlement to a jury trial. 
6 And if we did go to trial -- this case 
7 is now set for trial in about two-plus weeks, for 
8 three days -- if it were to go to trial, there 
9 would be no evidence that would entitle a jury to 
10 make a finding on one key issue -- or, actually 
11 two, but I'm going to principally, your Honor, 
12 argue just one issue this morning. 
13 Your Honor, there's the -- we start 
14 from the premise of the Reagan Outdoor 
15 Advertising case, that the major purpose of 
16 summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trial, 
17 by allowing the parties to pierce the pleadings 
18 and determine whether there's a genuine issue to 
19 present to the fact finder. __ 
20 In accordance with this purpose, 
21 specific facts are required to show whether 
22 there's a genuine issue for trial. 
23 The allegations of a pleading, of 
24 factual conclusions of an affidavit, are 
25 insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact. 
Campbell: Principal Argument Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 And with that, your Honor, let me turn 
2 -- because the court's well aware of the summary 
3 judgment standards in this jurisdiction -- but 
4 let me turn, if the court please, to one of the 
5 key paragraphs that is at the heart of the 
i 
6 dispute between Rehab and Sports Medicine. 
7 And, Judge, whether we take the time, a 
8 few minutes this morning, or whether we take 
9 three days, we're going to be talking about one 
10 specific paragraph in the contract, in the 
11 termination agreement b.etween these two parties, < 
12 And that's Paragraph 11. 
13 This is the paragraph, your Honor. We 
14 put this up in hopes it might be of some help to ' 
15 your Honor. And it reads as follows: "The 
16 Purchase of the Center. It is agreed that if 
i 
17 within Two (2) years from the date of this 
18 Agreement, Physicians "-- Salt Lake Knee and 
19 Sports Medicine -- "sells the Center to any third 
20 party, Rehabilitation "-- that's the plaintiff 
21 here -- "shall be entitled to one third (1/3) of 
22 that portion of the purchase price which is ( 
23 attributed to goodwill. 
24 "Sale," your Honor, "shall be defined 
25 as a transfer wherein the purchaser acquires and * 
Campbell: Principal Argument 
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5 
1 pays consideration for all" -- for all -- "of the 
2 following: 
3 "The Center's lease on the Leased 
4 Premises, ownership of the name 'Salt Lake Sports 
5 Medicine Center,' all of the equipment and other 
6 assets located at the Center, the Center's 
7 patients and accounts receivable, and whereby the 
8 purchaser" -- in other words, if Physicians or 
9 Salt Lake Knee sells to the third party --
10 "whereby the purchaser assumes complete 
11 operational control of the business of the Center 
12 and continues operating under the same name at 
13 the same location," 
14 Now, if the court please, we brought 
15 this motion before the court on the basis that --
16 two bases, and I'm going to address one 
17 principally in the argument this morning -- that, 
18 your Honor, there's no evidence that the sale 
19 between the Physicians, or between Salt Lake 
20 Knee, and IHC, which is the one that's supposedly 
21 triggered this clause, Paragraph 11, there's no 
22 evidence that that sale, your Honor, included the 
23 name "Salt Lake Sports Center." 
24 And that's the definition of a sale. 
25 There is -- not only is there, your Honor, no 
Campbell: Principal Argument 
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1 evidence of that -- and if the court were to hear 
2 it, the court will, No. 1, note this: 
3 Your Honor, Rehab, even in their brief 
4 on this motion, have said this to the court. 
5 The plaintiff admits that the name 
6 "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" does not 
7 appear as an asset generated pursuant to the 
8 transaction resulting in the ownership of the 
9 Center by the joint venture IHC and Sports 
10 Medicine. 
11 This is the deposition, your Honor, of 
12 Mr. Gardner, the principal for Rehab, the 
13 plaintiff. I asked him the question: 
14 QUESTION: And in order for this 
15 Paragraph 11 to be triggered, it is true, is it 
16 not, that your understanding is the name 'Salt 
17 Lake Sports Medicine Center1 had to be sold to 
18 the third party and used by the third party after 
19 the sale? 
20 ANSWER: That's correct. 
21 QUESTION: Can you point to any 
22 document or writing in which you are aware 
23 that the name 'Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
24 Center' was sold by Salt Lake Sports 
25 Medicine Center to IHC as part of the 
Campbell: Principal Argument 
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1 transaction that followed in May of 1990? 
2 ANSWER: No, I couldn't tell you. 
3 That was the answer. And the other 
4 Rehab principal, your Honor, Mr. Douglas Toole, 
5 also testified to the same thing. 
6 QUESTION: You have no knowledge or 
7 information that the name Salt Lake Sports 
8 Medicine Center or Sports Medicine Center 
9 was sold to IHC? 
10 ANSWER: I don't know that the name was 
11 sold, no. 
12 So we stand before the court, your 
13 Honor, with that testimony on the part of the 
14 plaintiff. That's what they would prove. 
15 This is the testimony that is 
16 uncontradicted. And this is the testimony, your 
17 Honor, before the court, of Dr. Paulos for Salt 
18 Lake Knee, Paragraph 11 of the affidavit: 
19 "Neither the name 'Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
20 Center' nor any interest therein was sold or 
21 otherwise conveyed to IHC or any third party." 
22 And, further, this is the principal, 
23 your Honor, who helped in the negotiations with 
24 IHC for Salt Lake Knee, for Dr. Paulos and 
2 5 Rosenberg. 
Campbell: Principal Argument 
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1 He testified that Salt Lake Sports 
2 Medicine Center, again the name was not sold. 
3 So, if the court please, what we of 
4 before the court is a fact that is not -- that 
5 has not been proved by the plaintiff, and is 
6 therefore missing in the linkage of evidence. 
7 There is, your Honor, one position that 
8 plaintiff has raised in opposition to this 
9 motion. And what they say is this, your Honor. 
10 They say that the Court of Appeals, in addressing 
11 this appeal, the Court of Appeals, your Honor, 
12 stated that there was only one issue remaining in 
13 the case. And that wasn't the question of 
14 whether there was a sale of the name but whether 
15 the name was actually used after the actual sale 
16 to IHC. 
17 And there's a statement in the -- this 
18 is the last paragraph, your Honor, of the Court 
19 of Appeals opinion in this case. 
20 And it reads. "Finally, according to 
21 the parties, the only remaining issue his whether 
22 the joint venture continued operating the 
23 business under the name 'Salt Lake Sports 
24 Medicine Center1." 
25 No place in the appeal was the issue of 
Campbell: Principal Argument 
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1 whether the sale included the name 'Salt Lake 
2 Sports Medicine' ever raised or discussed by the 
3 appellant or the defendant. Thus -- and I should 
4 say, your Honor, I'm sorry; this is the way we 
5 cut this up. This is not part of the quote. The 
6 only quote I have quoted is the first part. 
7 This is my statement: What the Court 
8 of Appeals said and what was before your Honor 
9 are two different things, your Honor, and there's 
10 a legion of cases saying that a Court of Appeals, 
11 an appellate court, can only decide the issues 
12 that have been raised. 
13 And, Judge, we of looked and looked in 
14 vain for any -- and I want counsel to tell the 
15 court where it is, where it is, that they have 
16 raised, Rehab raised on appeal to the Court of 
17 Appeals -- the issue of whether or not there was 
18 a sale, that is to say a sale of the name, what 
19 we're talking about here. 
20 The court was focusing on whether IHC 
21 constituted a third party, and this court said 
22 no, because you -- initially, you said no, 
23 because Salt Lake Knee, the Physicians, actually 
24 retained an interest, one-half interest, they 
25 only sold a half of an interest. 
Campbell: Principal Argument 
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1 But the Court of Appeals has ruled on 
2 that. We're not here to talk about that. But, 
3 Judge, nobody -- I've looked at the briefs, I've 
4 looked at the oral argument in the case, nobody 
5 raised before the Court of Appeals --
6 specifically the plaintiff -- no one raised the 
7 issue of whether or not the name was sold. There 
8 isn't any writing to that effect, Judge; none at 
9 all. 
10 And accordingly, when the court said --
11 Court of Appeals said, "and according to the i 
12 parties the only remaining issue," that isn't the 
13 case, judge. We've got the briefs here; I'll 
14 show the court what the briefs look like. 
15 Nobody raised this issue. And if the 
16 court -- if the Court of Appeals wants to engage 
17 in dictum in observation, that's all it is. 
18 But their court runs its own business. 
19 And there is an old story that perhaps I don't 
20 need to tell your Honor, but about a federal 
21 district court judge sitting in Virginia, upon 
22 sitting in an actual deposition -- because they { 
23 couldn't get any witnesses -- told by Chief 
24 Justice Berger, because there had been a call 
25 from the English judiciary, from the Lord ' 
Campbell: Principal Argument 
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1 Chancellors to the Chief Justice's office 
2 apparently wondering what an American judge was 
3 doing effectively holding court in England. 
4 And the Chief Justice called Judge 
5 Merich -- who had been on the bench a long time, 
6 in the Fourth Circuit -- and said, Judge Merich, 
7 by any chance have you been in England lately? 
8 And Judge Merich, said, "your Honor, 
9 Chief Justice, Ifll answer that two ways: No. 1, 
10 yes, I have. And, No. 2, I don't work for you." 
11 And that's very true. And this court 
12 doesn't work for anybody else. This court 
13 doesn't work for the Court of Appeals. It 
14 understands what the Court of Appeals did, and we 
15 understand the rule of stare decisis. 
16 But the rule of res judicata, this 
17 issue was never raised. And I'd like to see 
18 counsel show the court where it is, where the 
19 issue of whether or not the sale included the 
20 sale of the name is, because it clearly isn't. 
21 And we are entitled, your Honor, to a 
22 trial on that issue and to a decision on that 
2 3 issue. 
24 And what that same Court of Appeals has 
25 said, your Honor, in the D'Aston case, is this: 
Campbell: Principal Argument 
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1 "Even when a judgment is ultimately reversed on 
2 appeal..., the reversal does not necessarily 
3 operate as an adjudication by the appellate court 
4 of any question other than those which were, in 
5 terms, discussed and decided by the appellate 
6 court. 
7 "Thus, while a reversal effectively 
8 invalidates the prior judgment with respect to 
9 those issues addressed in the appeal, it extends 
10 only to those issues which the appellate court 
11 decided in actuality or by necessary implication. 
12 It does not affect collateral matters not before 
13 the court." 
14 And this issue wasn't there, your 
15 Honor. And, accordingly, it's back before this 
16 court. 
17 The Court of Appeals never addressed 
18 this issue, your Honor; they never considered it. 
19 They never decided it. 
20 They never precluded its consideration 
21 on remand, whether the name 'Salt Lake Sports 
22 Medicine1 was sold. 
23 And we, therefore, your Honor, are in a 
24 position in which this central issue sale shall 
25 be defined as all of the following: ownership of 
Campbell: Principal Arg 
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1 the name Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center. 
2 Your Honor, there's other case law I 
3 could talk about and review with the court, but 
4 this is the principal question, and I submit to 
5 the court we can lodge with your Honor copies of 
6 the appellate briefs. 
7 There's no one who has stated -- not 
8 only did no one state "the only remaining issue 
9 of fact is whether or not the name was actually 
10 used after the sale," but there's no statement by 
11 any of the parties. 
12 And maybe Mr. Green can improve our 
13 minds, but he didn't do so in his brief. In fact 
14 he says he stipulates. 
15 What are we going to do? We're going to 
16 forget this particular clause in the contract and 
17 pretend it doesn't exist, that the parties didn't 
18 actually say that, for a sale to take place, it 
19 shall include the ownership of the name, 'Salt 
20 Lake Sports Medicine'? 
21 I submit to the court that there's not 
22 an issue before the court on this, and as a 
23 matter of law this court may enter -- and should 
24 and in fact must -- summary judgment. Because 
25 we're entitled to a trial, and there isn't going 
Campbell: Principal Argument 
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1 to be any evidence before the court on this 
2 issue. 
3 And the court would have to instruct 
4 the jury to direct a verdict in favor of 
5 Physicians or Salt Lake Knee. 
6 Judge, there's another issue that is 
7 before the court, and under our motion. And that 
8 is whether or not goodwill was involved in the 
9 sale. Because going back to the initial -- the 
10 issue of whether or not this sale to IHC, if it 
11 was a sale -- and the Court of Appeals said so; 
12 we're not going to argue that -- shall be 
13 entitled to one-third of that purchase price 
14 which is attributable to goodwill. i 
15 The evidence, your Honor -- the issue 
16 is whether or not there was goodwill. 
17 And the evidence upon the part of the { 
18 plaintiffs is that there was not goodwill. There 
19 was $662,000 -- this is from the affidavit also 
20 of Dr. Lonnie Paulos. 
21 "IHC did not identify or value any 
22 goodwill associated with any assets in which it 
23 acquired an interest from Salt Lake Sports 
24 Medicine, nor did it allocate any portion of the 
25 $662,225.00 purchase price to goodwill associated j 
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1 therewith. 
2 "As part of the Asset Purchase 
3 Agreement with IHC, Dr. Rosenberg and I were 
4 requested to sign a noncompetition agreement 
5 pursuant to which we agreed that we would not 
6 compete with IHC or with the medical practices 
7 being purchased by IHC from us." 
8 The $662,000, your Honor, was 
9 substantially attributable to two of the 
10 outstanding orthopedic sports physicians in the 
11 western United States agreeing that they wouldn't 
12 compete with this joint venture in which Salt 
13 Lake Knee was a -- and Dr. Paulos went on, your 
14 Honor, in Paragraph 14, to say: 
15 "It was my intent and understanding in 
16 negotiating and executing that agreement that any 
17 multiples paid by IHC to acquire an interest in 
18 practices that Dr. Rosenberg and I maintained at 
19 the aforesaid clinics, and any related assets, 
20 was in consideration for the patients and 
21 practices that Dr. Rosenberg and I maintained at 
22 the Eighth Avenue clinic and the Park City Clinic 
23 for the execution by us of the aforesaid 
24 non-competition agreement. 
25 "No part of the purchase price of IHC 
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1 to acquire an undivided one-half interest in the 
2 practices and clinics maintained and operated by 
3 Dr. Rosenberg and me were allocated to any 
4 goodwill involving the Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
5 Center." 
6 And that's the evidence, your Honor, on 
7 the part of the defendant, I will concede, your 
8 Honor, that in the purchase agreement between IHC 
9 and Salt Lake Knee, the Physicians, there's some 
10 generic language as to what assets were sold; not 
11 the name, but it does refer to goodwill. 
12 My client is saying there wasn't 
13 anything allocated; there were no monies 
14 allocated to goodwill. 
15 And we submit that that is the state of 
16 the evidence. No evidence on the part of the 
17 plaintiff that the court will see in which the 
18 plaintiff can show to the court that there was in 
19 fact -- that the par-ties negotiated and paid IHC, 
20 paid to my clients, the Physicians, a sum of 
21 money for goodwill. 
22 But I do concede that that phrase 
23 "goodwill" is in a generic setting in the 
24 particular assets that were conveyed. 
25 We've made it a part of the summary 
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1 / 
1 judgment motion, I think there may be enough 
2 evidence, at the least for the plaintiff to argue 
3 on that issue, that that precludes summary 
4 judgment• 
5 But, Judge, not on this question of 
6 whether or not the agreement included a sale of 
7 the name; and that, we've submitted to the court, 
8 is a matter for summary judgment. 
9 And it is an issue that haunts the 
10 plaintiff's position in this case, and it will 
11 remain the case, because there's no evidence of 
12 that. 
13 And all that the plaintiff can hang 
14 their hat on is this obiter dictum statement of 
15 the Court of Appeals. 
16 But those people up there, Judge in the 
17 Court of Appeals, over on Second South and Fifth 
18 East, they didn't have anything before them that 
19 allowed them to enter into a statement like that. 
20 They had nothing; there were no issues 
21 raised and there was no argument made, and 
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1 MR, GREEN: Your Honor, I believe that 
2 the memorandum of the plaintiff in 
3 opposition to this motion has been fully 
4 developed and answers all of counsel's 
5 assertions with regard to why summary 
6 judgment should be granted the defendant. 
7 However, I would just like to address a 
8 couple of matters that counsel talked about. 
9 First of all, the dicta that counsel referred to 
10 in the decision came just before the conclusion 
11 or basically the ruling, and actually what it 
12 says is, "Finally, according to the parties, the 
13 only remaining issue his whether the joint 
14 venture continued operating the business under 
15 the name 'Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center.' 
16 "The trial court did not reach this 
17 issue, notwithstanding disputed, material facts, 
18 having resolved the matter on the issue of sale 
19 o f a s s e t s . 
20 "Because of the existence of disputed 
21 material facts, the issue of whether the joint 
22 venture continued to operate the business under 
23 the same name is remanded to the trial court for 
24 determination." 
25 Now, those facts, those issues of fact, 
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1 still remain to be resolved. Quite frankly, we 
2 believe that, based on the dicta of the appellate 
3 court, and its subsequent decision, that frankly 
4 the defendant is barred from raising this issue 
5 for the first time in this very lengthy 
6 litigation. 
7 In other words, even if it is not 
8 barred, there are facts in dispute with regard 
9 not only to the sale of the name, but the issue 
10 of goodwill itself. 
11 In our memorandum in opposition, we do 
12 cite the court to the case of Sorensen v. 
13 Sorensen, which is 769 p.2d 820, which basically 
14 defines what goodwill is, for example. 
15 And it goes through a rather lengthy 
16 definition, but states that advantage or --
17 goodwill is defined as: 
18 "...an advantage or benefit which is 
19 acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere 
20 value of the capital stock, funds, or property 
21 employed therein, in consequence of the general 
22 public patronage and encouragement which it 
23 receives from constant or habitual customers, on 
24 account of its local position, or common 
25 celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, 
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1 or punctuality, or from other accidental 
2 circumstances or necessities, or even from 
3 ancient partialities or prejudices." 
4 It goes on: "In the accounting field, 
5 goodwill is referred to generally as 'the 
6 summation of all the special advantages, not 
7 otherwise identifiable, related to a going 
8 concern.' 
9 "It includes such items as good name, 
10 capable staff and personnel, high credit 
11 standing, reputation for superior products and 
12 services, and favorable location." 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Green, let me interrupt 
14 you. I'm not persuaded that they're 
15 entitled to summary judgment on the subject 
16 of goodwill. 
17 I think goodwill is what you just read 
18 there, it raises issues of fact, and you would be 
19 entitled to put on evidence as far as goodwill. 
20 So, as far as that issue is concerned, 
21 and after hearing Mr. Campbell, I'm still not 
22 persuaded there's sufficient evidence to grant 
23 summary judgment on goodwill. But the first 
24 issue, I'm still out on that. 
25 MR. GREEN: Well, your Honor, again, we 
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1 believe that -- also we cite the court to 
2 South Utah Mortuary v. Olpin in our 
3 memorandum, and that what we're saying is 
4 goodwill can't be transferred out -- I mean 
5 goodwill in and of itself is not 
6 transferable, but whether it is -- when 
7 there's a sale of a business, such as we had 
8 here, goodwill goes with it, 
9 And we say, according to Sorensen, that 
10 a good name, many times name is a part of that 
11 sale as well. 
12 In this particular instance, there's no 
13 specific reference to the name, but again we say 
14 that there's evidence before the court that they 
15 used the name. They used the name subsequent to 
16 the sale from the Physicians to IHC for at least 
17 four months. 
18 And we say that the use of the name 
19 constitutes a purchase of that name, and 
20 therefore even if the appellate court hadn't 
21 barred this issue, there's sufficient facts that 
22 are material and are disputed with regard to that 
23 issue, that I believe the court would be 
24 precluded from granting summary judgment on that 
25 issue alone. 
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1 THE COURT: How do you get around the 
2 express language of the contract, where it 
3 says that all-- and it indicates four items 
4 -- that shall be sold? And the name is one 
5 of them? 
6 MR. GREEN: Well, again, I believe that 
7 either the parties or the court itself dealt 
8 with all of those issues. 
9 The issue before the appellate court --
10 and we would submit that the only reason that the 
11 appellate court didn't rule specifically on that 
12 name is because it wanted to refer it back to 
13 your Honor to make the decision, to look at the 
14 witnesses with regard to their credibility and 
15 determine whether or not they did in fact use the 
16 name, whether or not the use of the name for any 
17 period of time would in fact constitute a 
18 purchase of that particular item. 
19 I mean, in this sale, again, your 
20 Honor, they did obtain complete operational 
21 control. The court determined that the sale to 
22 IHC constituted a saile to a third party. 
23 There was certainly a sale of the 
24 patient list, and the receivables, and there was 
25 certainly a sale of the equipment. 
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1 Now, specifically the court's found 
2 that goodwill was sold, 
3 THE COURT: Where did the court find 
4 that goodwill was sold? 
5 MR, GREEN: Well, in finding that 
6 the -- or at least it was included. 
7 THE COURT: Well, if we go to trial on 
8 this matter, and the defendants call your 
9 clients to the stand, and ask them if 
10 goodwill -- or ask them if the name Salt 
11 Lake Sports Medicine was sold, and they 
12 answer the way they did in the deposition, 
13 how am I to rule or is a jury to rule? 
14 MR. GREEN: Well, your Honor, in the 
15 deposition, I mean that -- they didn't refer 
16 them to any of the contracts, and in fact my 
17 clients weren't even party to the contracts 
18 that gave rise to this sale. This was 
19 between IHC and the Physicians. We had no 
20 control over that. 
21 I mean we're either arguing substance 
22 over form, either they sold the entire business, 
23 including the name, or they didn't. But we would 
24 submit that the evidence will show that 
25 subsequent to the sale, subsequent to the 
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1 transfer of the assets, subsequent to the 
2 transfer of operational control, subsequent to 
3 all of that, they continued to use the name 'Salt 
4 Lake Sports Medicine Center1. And on that basis, 
5 that should constitute a sale, 
6 THE COURT: You said they used it for 
7 approximately four months. Is that a very 
8 long time? That's almost the time it takes 
9 for them to scratch the name off the door. 
10 MR. GREEN: Actually, those facts are 
11 in controversy. We have --. 
12 THE COURT: I'm just quoting from what 
13 you said. 
14 MR. GREEN: I'm saying at least they 
15 acknowledged the use of the name for at 
16 least that period of time. We have 
17 affidavits in our memorandum from totally 
18 disinterested parties that can indicate that 
19 that name was not removed for a period of 
2 0 year and a half. 
21 And that it was only removed in 
22 response to this lawsuit. And, again, we 
23 believe, on that, you know -- I mean in order for 
24 the court, you know,, to buy their position, it 
25 would almost seem that you would have to find 
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1 that, you know, the name had no value whatsoever, 
2 And you can't do that in terms of what 
3 the facts are before this court, 
4 THE COURT: Of course you want me to 
5 rule here that, although there was nothing 
6 in the contract anyplace which expressley 
7 states that the name Salt Lake Sports Center 
8 is part of the sale when it's sold, you want 
9 me to imply the actions of the parties and 
10 the goodwill that went with it, that the 
11 name itself was sold. 
12 Am I then rewriting the contract or am 
13 I -- do I have to look at the four corners of 
14 this contract to make any decision? 
15 MR. GREEN: Your Honor, I just think 
16 that, under the circumstances, this -- these 
17 contracts, and the contracts that you have 
18 to look at, were prepared -- at least the 
19 sales agreements -- were all prepared by the 
20 defendants in this case. 
21 They should be construed against them, 
22 therefore. They actually prepared the 
23 termination agreement also. 
24 But, you know, the entire package went, 
25 and we're saying that, pursuant to Utah law, and 
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1 the cases cited, that the name is included. And 
2 since they used the name, then, there's no 
3 question but that they purchased it. 
4 THE COURT: Of course you say the use 
5 of the name --• and I don't remember reading 
6 in your material -- but that they used the 
7 name for a year and a half. Did somebody 
8 say that? 
9 , MR. GREEN: Yes. 
10 THE COURT:: Who was that? 
11 MR. GREEN: We have the affidavits of 
12 two totally unrelated -- or, parties 
13 unrelated to this lawsuit; Mr. Beers and 
14 Mr. Mayer, who indicated that this did 
15 not -- they did not come down for at least a 
16 year and a half, and that it came down 
17 pursuant to or in response to the lawsuit; 
18 at least those outside signs. 
19 THE COURT: Why did it come down in 
20 response to the lawsuit? 
21 MR. GREEN: Pardon. 
22 THE COURT: Why did it come down in 
23 response to the lawsuit? 
24 MR. GREEN: We don't know, your Honor. 
25 We're just assuming that when they became 
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1 involved in the claims with the lawsuit/ 
2 that they thought/ "we better get rid of the 
3 name." And we think that's --. 
4 THE COURT: That's an indication they 
5 didn't own the name and they thought they'd 
6 better get r i d o f it. 
7 MR. GREEN: It also indicates they used 
8 it your Honor/ continued to use it# 
9 continued to utilize that name. That was 
10 part of what they were selling. 
11 You know, I would submit/ your Honor/ 
12 again/ there was a contract entered into between 
13 these parties/ and they established, you know, 
14 that there was -- that my clients were entitled 
15 to money for/ you know, a third of the goodwill. 
16 We're just submitting at this point in 
17 time that, you know, there had to be some 
18 consideration there. They then, you know, 
19 continued; they sold it. They sold the entire 
20 going concern. 
21 I mean Paulos, for example, is now 
22 saying for first time in the lawsuit that the 
23 extra money went to noncompetition. There's 
24 nothing in the documents that says that any money 
25 was attributable to those noncompetitions. 
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1 But there's indication that, you know, 
2 that money should be attributed to goodwill, and 
3 that is in the agreement between Paulos and IHC. 
4 THE COURT: I have no problem with 
5 that. I have no problem with that. But I 
6 still have a problem where it specifically 
7 states ownership of the name 'Salt Lake 
8 Sports Medicine Center'. 
9 And that is one of the terms of the 
10 contract. Of course I have this same problem --
11 I had it -- when I ruled three years ago, and I 
12 was wrong, Mr. Green. And I was wrong. 
13 MR. GREEN: And we believe, again, the 
14 court -- it was more than dicta when it 
15 indicated what the issues, the only issues 
16 that were being remanded, were. Those were 
17 not whether they sold the name; it was 
18 whether they used the name, used it long 
19 enough to constitute a sale, and whether 
20 there was money a attributable to goodwill. 
21 THE COURT: Ifm not persuaded the Court 
22 of Appeals addressed this issue at all. I 
23 think they looked at my ruling as far as all 
24 of the ownership being sold, and -- which I 
25 said only half of it was sold, therefore it 
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1 was not a sale. 
2 And they said it was a joint venture, 
3 and so be it. I don't remember addressing the 
4 issue, and I don't think it was ever raised 
5 before me, as far as the name. 
6 I don't know this; but I probably just 
7 assumed it was sold in there, and didn't even 
8 consider it, because I don't remember considering 
9 a thing about it at all. 
10 MR. GREEN: Well, you know, I would 
11 submit it had not been addressed, but again 
12 I think that there's an issue with regard to 
13 whether the use of that name constitutes a 
14 sale, regardless of how those documents were 
15 drafted. 
16 Again, my clients were not party to 
17 those particular documents. That was just 
18 between IHC and Physicians, not between the 
19 plaintiffs, Rehab, and any other party. 
20 So we're sitting out here more or less 
21 subject to the whims of how Rosenberg and IHC 
22 drafted the documents. 
23 THE COURT: Well, and that might be. 
24 Maybe they were smart enough -- I don't know 
25 this -- maybe they were smart enough, they 
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read the contract, read it better than I did 
the first time when I went over it, and they 
noticed that, and they didn't put it in 
purposefully, to get around maybe the one-
d. I don't know that. Maybe they were that smart. 
MR. GREEN: Then we argue substance 
over form, your Honor. And, you know, the 
court can go beyond the mere documents to 
make a determination in this case. 
MR. CAMPBELL: Your Honor quickly --. 
THE COURT: Mr. Campbell, I'd like your 
view, to answer the question raised by 
Mr. Green as far as the use of the name and 
whether that amounted to constructive use. 
MR. CAMPBELL: Right, your Honor. At 
the best, at the best, your Honor, what 
counsel has just said, after admitting in 
his brief that the plaintiff admits the name 
does not appear as an asset on any list 
generated pursuant to the transaction 
resulting in ownership of the Center by the 
joint venture -- and this is the contract, 
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1 the clause, that's in force. 
2 I submit to the court that the four 
3 months, that's what they say in their brief, 
4 "however, it is likewise undisputed that the 
5 joint venture continued using the name 'Salt Lake 
6 Medicine Center' for at least four months 
7 following sale." 
8 They never used the word "Center;" it 
9 was "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center." They 
10 were taking down the signs during -- for a period 
11 of four months. 
12 Is there any evidence, Judge, they 
13 filed an assumed business name or that the joint 
14 venture ever used this on billing statements, on 
15 correspondence, that IHC and the Physicians, 
16 Paulos and Rosenberg did? 
17 There isn't any evidence of that, that 
18 they ever used the name once this joint venture 
19 was formed, or that thereafter they used it in 
20 any capacity, besides just taking down the names 
21 that were there and putting up their own name, 
22 your Honor, which is Sports Medicine West. 
23 That's the name; that was the name that the joint 
24 venture adopted. 
25 And when I think what the court, at 
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1 both stages, has had in mind, "all" means all; 
2 "all of the following." "Sale should be defined 
3 as transfer if purchaser acquires and pays 
4 consideration for all the following; ownership of 
5 the name Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center." The 
6 court -- as the court said, we've got to rewrite 
7 this contract, according to these fellows, if 
8 that's the case. 
9 And the issue, your Honor, the -- I 
10 mean, as the court suggested, taking down the 
11 name, is not reflective of the fact that the name 
12 went with the transfer. 
13 If anything, that's evidence of the 
14 fact they didn't own it, that they weren't using 
15 the name. And taking it down is demonstration 
16 that it's not part of the transaction. 
17 There's no evidence, your Honor, that 
18 -- through depositions or otherwise -- there's 
19 anything to indicate that this transaction was 
20 intentionally skewed to avoid the Rehab contract. 
21 That could have been -- if that had 
22 been done, they could of easily done it. They 
23 could have dropped out the word "goodwill." They 
24 could of said, "this sale does not include 
2 5 goodwill." 
Campbell: Rebuttal Argument 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 









., T h e y ' r e n j . u i 
\ i w i ' i . i l i a i w o u l d n a v e b e e n e a s y m V r t , ! r 
l i d n ' t do t h a t i •• h i ij t h a t \~u&-
#'*->» -j V x s some L" J i m e v i d e n c e on < | O n d w i l l , I ' m 
i i t a r g u i n g 1 Liu t i I n l ' 
V v e ' i c a r g u i n g t h e q u e s t i o n n f w h e t h e r 
i n o t t h i s c o u r t i s
 M« II> I i n i" o i: 
. MI L ulie t u u i L i L s t l f "i i i- g«»iug to rewrite 
t his contrac t. 
And what- 1 say I M Ihr rourt about the 
four-month period JI > u ' ssue, that xs 
1 .• : t; a ] ] y immaterial to 1 h€- quest ion ot whether the 
s a 1 e I,iieluded i lit.1 n ame • 
•: •* .• And 1 -l in t, e t o 1 hc• cou r t the case of 
1 5 Horqa v. Industrial Design , i n w II I r h the Su pi" erne 
i' ! I s stated, x ix 1982, n w e a g ree w i t h 
.*. ei:U 
r. : . : 1 ' s assertion, i Wei e , 'i< i i I, ne issues 
However, the mexe existence of a 
; v •- issue ot t a d , «>, \* Joes not 
20 ' < cxuue the entry of summary -judgment if those 
2 1 i s s u e s a r e i mm a t e r i <J " " • ^rulucion o t u a e 
2 2 case." 
An 
'III J- L. U W L1.LS_ w f\ 
- --» Ac a -f 
ncinuea use. 
lesciou: "W h a t 
Camr i ument 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
34 
1 are we going to do in two weeks? Are we going to 
2 try this and let the jury say no.to Paragraph 11, 
3 "it doesn't really mean what it says"? 
4 Are we going to let them say, "well, 
5 apparently, even though you did not, we're going 
6 to rely upon the clause that says there's some 
7 goodwill in the sale, and there's nothing in 
8 there about the name"? 
9 We're going to let the jury speculate, 
10 and rewrite the contract for us? Then, your 
11 Honor, that isn't the way that I know this court 
12 conducts business, 
13 But I will say one thing: That the 
14 Court of Appeals never touched this issue. And 
15 Judge, here are the briefs. If the court would 
16 like to see them, these are the briefs of the 
17 parties on appeal. This issue was never raised 
18 on appeal by Mr, Green, 
19 It was never raised by the defendant, 
20 It was never even decided by anybody. The points 
21 on appeal, the issues, I've asked counsel to 
22 cite, just give the court one suggestion where 
23 the Court of Appeals touched this issue, and they 
2 4 didn f t. 
25 They didn't even address the issue, and 
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1 it was that there had to be a factual 
2 determination whether or not that name was 
3 actually used by the defendants subsequent to the 
4 sale. 
5 This issue, as far as the defendants 
6 are now concerned, just came up in this motion 
7 for summary judgment for the first time within 30 
8 days. It has never -- it was never raised as a 
9 defense to the -- our complaint. 
10 You know, certainly we don't know 
11 whether they used it on their letterhead. 
12 Certainly we do not know whether they used it --
13 or, applied for a dba. 
14 Perhaps that is something that has to 
15 be discovered and this trial continued. I would 
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stated to the court the fact that the only 
issue that could be of concern to the court 
was this issue raised on appeal. 
Counsel said, "no, it wasn't raised on 
al. " So how in heaven's name could the Court 
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5 THE COURT: Well, counsel, let me 
6 indicate this to you. As I have been 
7 reading your pleadings, first of all let me 
8 indicate, or state, that, no, I don't think 
9 this issue was raised on appeal. 
10 I don't think this issue was raised to 
11 me on the first motion for summary judgment. 
12 This court does not recall any issue at all of 
13 this sort on the particular name. 
14 I would state to you that if this had 
15 been raised on the first instance of summary 
16 judgment, that the court probably, 
17 unhesitatingly, would have granted the 
18 defendant's motion, as I read the particular 
19 contract. 
20 I'm more hesitant now, just because of 
21 the fact that I ruled on this motion for summary 
22 judgment once that all the assets were not sold. 
23 The Court of Appeals said that I was wrong, and 
24 of course got into a discussion of joint venture, 
2 5 and so be it. 
Court's Ruling 
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1 evidentiary question, and that the plaintiff 
2 would have the right to put on evidence as to 
3 whether goodwill was included in that amount of 
4 the purchase price. 
5 MR. CAMPBELL: I'll prepare the order, 
6 your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Would you, please. 
8 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, your Honor. Thank 
9 you. 





15 (Whereupon, the instant 
16 proceedings 
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